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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
We produce and consume goods and services that have gone through networks.
Airlines, railroads, computer networks, and social networks are a few examples. However,
those goods and services are not always beneficial to everyone. For example, firms may earn
less profits because the products of their rival firms are brought to markets through supply
chains. Revenue services may earn less tax revenue because taxable assets are transferred
through financial networks and can be concealed in other countries. Websites and network
service providers may suffer from malicious software sent through the Internet. Countries
and their citizens may suffer from hazardous materials carried through transportation sys-
tems. In these contexts, competing products, concealed assets, malicious software, and
hazardous materials are viewed as bads, as opposed to goods, because they are harmful to
some economic agents. My research on the economics of network flows is motivated by (i)
the possibility of bads being carried through networks, together with goods, (ii) the analy-
sis of strategic behavior of agents in networks, and (iii) the experimental test of theoretical
predictions about strategic behavior.
Chapter II develops a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative
game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow spec-
ifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously,
an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through
arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked
arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss
and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model I
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study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent
of the target loss. My model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing
non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. My research also
advances models and results on network interdiction.
Chapter III introduces a strategic network model where bads, such as infectious
diseases and liquidity shocks, arise at a source node and may be transmitted to a sink
node as a flow through a network. Two players wish to decrease network bads, which is
determined by the extent of bads at the source node and by the maximum transmission of
bads through the network. One player can act to mitigate the extent at the source node
while the other player can act to reduce the maximum transmission through the network.
Each player incurs the cost of action but benefits from the decrease in network bads. The
bottlenecks of the network affect the maximum transmission of bads and the behavior
of the players. I characterize efficient profiles and equilibria in terms of the bottlenecks.
Interestingly, the player who acts in an equilibrium may not be the player who must act
in the efficient profile. Overall, strategic inaction leads to inefficiency. Unless there is an
efficient equilibrium where neither player acts, no efficient profile is an equilibrium and no
equilibrium is efficient. I study cooperative solutions where the players jointly choose an
efficient profile and make transfers to each other. Such cooperative solutions always exist.
Chapter IV builds a strategic model that exhibits the power law of conflict.1 The
power law of conflict is the name given to an empirical regularity that the frequency of
conflict events, such as murders, insurgencies, and wars, scales as an inverse power of the
severity of conflict events. In this model there are two adversarial players. Attacker can
carry bads through a route to damage a target while Defender can block the route to stop
1This chapter is based on Chapter II and joint work with John Wooders. Besides allowing the study
of comparative statices leading to a power law, this chapter aims to provide a theoretical foundation for
empirical and experimental testing of the power law.
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the transport of bads. In the unique equilibrium both Attacker and Defender choose mixed
strategies. The comparative statics of the mixed strategy equilibrium yields a power law.
The parameters of the power law can be estimated from data. The power law is a good fit
to the Iraqi data in Global Terrorism Database.
3
CHAPTER II
STRATEGIC NETWORK INTERDICTION
Introduction
This chapter introduces a model with two players, an adversary and an agency,
interacting strategically in a given network. The adversary is given a bounded quantity of
bads at a base node and plans to carry bads to a target node. The adversary chooses a
flow of bads that specifies a plan for carrying bads through the network from the base to
the target. The agency is operating the network and wishes to stop the transport of bads
to the target. The agency chooses a blockage of arcs that specifies a plan for stopping the
transport of bads through the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss
while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from
both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads.
In this model I analyze the equilibrium behavior of the players. If the bounded
quantity of bads is small, there are pure strategy Nash equilibria. In these equilibria,
the adversary carries bads up to the bounded quantity in a dispersed way through the
network, but the agency does not block any arcs. If the bounded quantity of bads is either
intermediate or large, there are mixed strategy Nash equilibria in which each player chooses
only two pure strategies with positive probability. In these equilibria, the adversary carries
no bads or carries a positive amount of bads to the target. Meanwhile, the agency blocks no
arcs or blocks all the arcs necessary to make the target unreachable through the network.
My analysis shows which arcs the agency blocks and how often she blocks them. My analysis
also shows how the adversary carries bads through the network and how often he does.
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In these Nash equilibria, the adversary successfully carries bads to the target if
and only if the adversary carries a positive amount of bads to the target and the agency
does not block any arcs. By computing the probability of this joint event, we can calculate
the equilibrium probability of the target loss. If the bounded quantity of bads is either
intermediate or large, there is a power law relation between the probability and the extent
of the target loss. This theoretical finding is consistent with empirical evidence.1
This paper contributes to the game theory literature by introducing noncooper-
ative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel network flow model. Kalai and Zemel (24) define a
(transferable utility) cooperative game, called a flow game, where the worth of a coalition
is defined as the value of a maximum flow in the network restricted to the members of the
coalition.2 Their main result is that a cooperative flow game is totally balanced and thus
has a nonempty core (that is, there are distributions of the total payoff of the game that
are stable against the formation of coalitions). The core of a flow game depends on the
structure of a network and the ownership of arcs in the network. My framework differs
in that players interact strategically. The agency owns and operates all arcs in a network
while the adversary abuses the network.
This paper also contributes to the literature on network interdiction. Washburn
and Wood (40) introduce a zero-sum game, where an evader chooses a path to move through
a network and an interdictor chooses an arc at which to set up an inspection site. If the
evader traverses a path that includes the inspected arc, the evader is detected with some
exogenously given positive probability. Otherwise, the evader is not detected. Both players
are allowed to choose mixed strategies. Given a mixed strategy profile, the interdiction
1In empirical research Bohorquez et al. (5) and Clauset et al. (11) show that the fatality distribution of
terrorist events follows a power law.
2For other studies on cooperative flow games, see Kalai and Zemel (25), Granot and Granot (20), Potters
et al. (34), and Reijnierse et al. (35).
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probability is defined to be the average probability of the evader being detected. The
evader aims to minimize the interdiction probability by choosing a path-selection mixed
strategy, while the interdictor aims to maximize the interdiction probability by choosing an
arc-inspection mixed strategy. By using linear programming and network flow techniques,
Washburn and Wood (40) study the Nash equilibria of this game.3
My model differs from the existing models on network interdiction in four aspects:
(i) The definition of a network is different in that each arc has a capacity.
(ii) The adversary is endowed with a quantity of bads, which may, in equilibrium, be
binding.
(iii) Both players have larger sets of strategies. The adversary chooses a flow rather than
a path. If there are multiple paths in a network, the adversary can use them all at
once. The agency chooses a blockage rather than an arc. That is, the agency can
block multiple arcs at once.
(iv) My model is not a zero-sum game nor even a strictly competitive game.
Because of (i), we do not need to take the detection probability as given. In my model this
probability is determined endogenously. By virtue of (ii), we can analyze how the adver-
sary’s resource constraint affects the adversary’s and the agency’s equilibrium behavior. By
virtue of (iii), my model creates a more tractable environment and gives sharper results on
equilibrium behavior. Because of (iv), we need to use a different solution technique to find
equilibria. I exploit the idea that in any Nash equilibrium each player is indifferent between
the pure strategies played with positive probability.
3Other than these papers, most of the literature on network interdiction deals with an interdictor’s
optimization problem subject to some budget constraints. See Cormican et al. (13), Israeli and Wood (22),
and Wood (41).
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Security in network games has attracted significant interest. For example, Ballester
et al. (4) study the interaction between players whose payoffs depend on a network. They
obtain a proportional relationship between how much effort a player exerts and how central
the player’s position is in the network. Baccara and Bar-Isaac (3) study the formation of
networks between criminals and terrorists and find optimal policies for law enforcement
agencies. Goyal and Vigier (19) study the design and protection of networks robust to
attacks from outside on the networks’ nodes.4
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a game-
theoretic model of network interdiction. Section 3 studies the Nash equilibria of the model.
Section 4 discusses my theoretical finding, together with empirical evidence, and also dis-
cusses future research topics.
Model
Two players, player 1 and player 2, strategically interact with each other in a
given network. Players can be thought of as firms in the context of market competition,
as a taxpayer and a revenue service in the context of tax evasion, as a malicious hacker
and a network operator in the context of network security, or as a terrorist group and a
security agency in the context of national security. Having these security applications in
mind, player 1 is called an adversary and player 2 is called an agency.
4For a survey on other literature on networks, see Jackson (23).
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Networks
A network consists of a set of nodes, N , a set of arcs, A ⊂ N × N , and a (row)
vector of arc capacities, c := (cij)(i,j)∈A. Each arc is an ordered pair of distinct nodes and
has a positive capacity. For each i, j ∈ N with i 6= j, if (i, j) ∈ A, node i is connected to
node j through arc (i, j) with capacity cij > 0. Formally a network is defined as a collection
(N,A, c).
Strategies
Player 1, the adversary, is given a bound quantity q > 0 of bads at a node. This
node is called base s. Player 1 plans to carry bads to another node. This node is called
target t. Player 1 chooses a flow of bads specifying a plan for carrying bads through network
(N,A, c) from base s to target t.
For each j ∈ N , denote by IA(j) := {(i, j) : (i, j) ∈ A} the set of the arcs coming
into node j and by OA(j) := {(j, i) : (j, i) ∈ A} the set of the arcs going out from node j.
Formally a flow of bads from base s to target t with bound quantity q in network
(N,A, c) is a (column) vector f := (fij)′(i,j)∈A satisfying the following constraints:
0 ≤ fij ≤ cij for each (i, j) ∈ A, (II.1)
fis = 0 for each (i, s) ∈ IA(s), (II.2)∑
(s,i)∈OA(s)
fsi ≤ q and (II.3)∑
(i,j)∈IA(j)
fij −
∑
(j,i)∈OA(j)
fji = 0 for each j ∈ N \ {s, t}. (II.4)
Constraint (II.1) says that each arc flow is at least zero and at most the arc capacity.
Constraint (II.2) says that each incoming flow to the base is zero. Constraint (II.3) says
that the total outgoing flow from the base does not exceed the bound quantity. Constraint
8
(II.4) says that at each node, except for the base and the target, the total incoming flow
equals to the total outgoing flow.
Denote by F (s, t, q,N,A, c) the set of all flows of bads from base s to target t with
bound quantity q in network (N,A, c). When there is no ambiguity, I use F instead of
F (s, t, q,N,A, c). Then the set of pure strategies for player 1 is denoted by F . By choosing
a flow f = (fij)′(i,j)∈A ∈ F , player 1 carries fij amount of bads through arc (i, j).
The value of a flow is defined as the total incoming flow to the target less the
total outgoing flow from the target. Thus, the value of a flow shows how many bads
player 1 carries to the target. Let v := (vij)(i,j)∈A be a (row) vector with vit = 1 for each
(i, t) ∈ IA(t), vti = −1 for each (t, i) ∈ OA(t), and vij = 0 for each (i, j) /∈ IA(t) ∪ OA(t).
Then the value of a flow f ∈ F is calculated as
v · f =
∑
(i,t)∈IA(t)
fit −
∑
(t,i)∈OA(t)
fti. (II.5)
Constraints (II.1) through (II.4) imply that the value of a flow is non-negative and
constrained by the bound quantity. That is, for each f ∈ F , it holds that
0 ≤ v · f ≤ q. (II.6)
A flow fo ∈ F is the zero flow if fo is the vector of zeros. A flow f τ ∈ F is trivial
if v · f τ = 0. Notice that the zero flow fo is trivial. A flow f∗ ∈ F is a maximum flow if for
each f ∈ F , we have v · f∗ ≥ v · f . Notice that the value of a maximum flow is constrained
by the bound quantity.
Player 2, the agency, wishes to stop the transport of bads to the target. Player
2 chooses a blockage of arcs specifying a plan for stopping the transport of bads through
network (N,A, c) to target t. Formally a blockage of arcs in network (N,A, c) is a (column)
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vector b := (bij)′(i,j)∈A with bij ∈ {0, 1} for each (i, j) ∈ A.
Denote by B(N,A, c) the set of all blockages of arcs in network (N,A, c). When
there is no ambiguity, I use B instead of B(N,A, c). Then the set of pure strategies for
player 2 is denoted by B. By choosing a blockage b = (bij)′(i,j)∈A ∈ B, if bij = 1, player 2
blocks arc (i, j), and if bij = 0, player 2 does not block the arc. For each b ∈ B, denote by
Ab := {(i, j) ∈ A : b = (bij)′(i,j)∈A and bij = 1} the set of all blocked arcs.
The capacity of a blockage is defined as the total capacity of the blocked arcs.
Thus, the capacity of a blockage shows how much total arc capacity player 2 blocks in the
network. The capacity of a blockage b ∈ B is calculated as
c · b =
∑
(i,j)∈A
cijbij . (II.7)
A cut (C,C) in network (N,A, c) is a partition of the node set N with s ∈ C
and t ∈ C. For each cut (C,C), an arc (i, j) ∈ A is a cut arc if i ∈ C and j ∈ C. That
is, through a cut arc (i, j), node i in C is connected to node j in C. For each cut (C,C),
denote by A(C,C) := {(i, j) ∈ A : i ∈ C and j ∈ C} the set of all cut arcs.
A blockage bo ∈ B is the zero blockage if bo is the vector of zeros. A blockage
b ∈ B is a cut blockage if there is a cut (C,C) such that A(C,C) = Ab. A blockage b∗ ∈ B
is a minimum cut blockage if for each cut blockage b, we have c · b∗ ≤ c · b.
The set of mixed strategies for player 1 is denoted by ∆(F ) and the set of mixed
strategies for player 2 is denoted by ∆(B).
Net Flows
We want to know how many bads player 1 successfully carries to the target when
player 1 chooses a flow of bads and player 2 chooses a blockage of arcs. To answer this
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question I introduce the definition of net flows. For each flow of bads and each blockage of
arcs, the net flow of bads to the target is obtained by (i) decomposing the flow of bads into
cycle flows and path flows and (ii) removing all the cycle flows and all the path flows with
blocked arcs.
An s − t path in network (N,A, c) is a sequence of distinct nodes i1, . . . , iK such
that (ik, ik+1) ∈ A for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1} with i1 = s and iK = t. In this case we say
that the s − t path includes arcs (i1, i2), . . . , (iK−1, iK). A cycle in network (N,A, c) is a
sequence of distinct nodes i1, . . . , iK such that (ik, ik+1) ∈ A for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,K − 1}
with (iK , i1) ∈ A. In this case we say that the cycle includes arcs (i1, i2), . . . , (iK−1, iK),
and (iK , i1). Denote by H the set of all s− t paths and cycles in network (N,A, c).
The arc-path-cycle incidence matrix of (N,A, c) is M := (mah)a∈A,h∈H with
mah =

1 if h ∈ H includes a ∈ A;
0 otherwise.
A cycle flow is a flow of bads along a cycle. A path flow is a flow of bads along
an s − t path. By the flow decomposition algorithm, which will be presented in Appendix
A, we can decompose a flow of bads into cycle flows and path flows.5 Formally, for each
f ∈ F , we can find a (column) vector x := (xh)′h∈H such that f = Mx. That is, either
along a cycle h ∈ H, or along an s− t path h ∈ H, player 1 carries xh amount of bads.
For vector x and each blockage b, let xb := (xbh)
′
h∈H be a (column) vector with
xbh =

xh if h is an s− t path including no blocked arcs;
0 otherwise.
That is, only along an s− t path h ∈ H with no blocked arcs, player 1 successfully carries
5The flow decomposition algorithm is developed by Ford and Fulkerson (14). For a discussion see Ahuja
et al. (1). In my model I use this algorithm to find net flows.
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xbh = xh amount of bads to the target.
We are ready to define net flows. For each f ∈ F and each b ∈ B, the net flow
of bads to target t under flow f and blockage b is a (column) vector f b := (f bij)
′
(i,j)∈A such
that Mxb = f b. Then the value of the net flow f b is calculated as v · f b, which shows how
many bads player 1 successfully carries to the target.
Notice that the net flow f b under a flow f and a blockage b contains no cycle flows.
Furthermore, the net flow f b
o
under a flow f and the zero blockage bo contains all path
flows but no cycle flows. A flow f ∈ F is acyclic if f = f bo . Also notice that the net flow
f b under a flow f and a cut blockage b is the zero flow fo. That is, if b is a cut blockage,
for each f ∈ F , we have f b = fo.
Example 1
Suppose that a network is given as (N,A, c), where N = {s, i1, i2, t} is the set of nodes,
A = {(s, i1), (s, i2), (i1, i2), (i2, t), (t, i1)} is the set of arcs, and c = (csi1 , csi2 , ci1i2 , ci2t, cti1) =
(4, 1, 2, 5, 2) is the vector of arc capacities. A bound quantity is given as q = 3. Suppose
that player 1 chooses a flow f = (fsi1 , fsi2 , fi1i2 , fi2t, fti1)
′ = (1, 1, 2, 3, 1)′. In Figure 1, each
solid circle indicates a node, each arrow indicates an arc. In each pair of numbers, the first
bold number indicates an arc flow, and the second light number indicates the arc capacity.
In network (N,A, c) there are two s− t paths s, i1, i2, t and s, i2, t and one cycle i1, i2, t, i1.
12
The arc-path-cycle incidence matrix of network (N,A, c) is
M =

1 0 0
0 1 0
1 0 1
1 1 1
0 0 1

where the first column corresponds to path s, i1, i2, t, the second column corresponds to
path s, i2, t, and the third column corresponds to cycle i1, i2, t, i1. By using the flow de-
composition algorithm, we find a vector x = (1, 1, 1)′ such that f = Mx. Each entry
of the vector x shows the amount of bads player 1 carries along path s, i1, i2, t, path
s, i2, t, and cycle i1, i2, t, i1, respectively. Now suppose that player 2 chooses a blockage
b = (bsi1 , bsi2 , bi1i2 , bi2t, bti1)
′ = (0, 1, 0, 0, 0)′. Then path s, i1, i2, t is the only s− t path with
no blocked arcs. Thus, xb = (1, 0, 0)′. Therefore, the net flow of bads to target t under flow
f and blockage b is f b =Mxb = (1, 0, 1, 1, 0)′ and the value of this net flow is v · f b = 1. 
s •HHHHHHHHj
1 1



*
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•
6
2 2
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3 5
t• 1 2
Figure 1. Network
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Payoff Functions
The bads carried to the target cause a target loss. This target loss is determined
by the value of the net flow of bads, v ·f b, as well as by the marginal target loss, `t > 0. For
each f ∈ F and each b ∈ B, the target loss amounts to `t(v · f b). Player 1 earns `t(v · f b)
and player 2 loses the same amount from the target loss.
The blocked arcs cause a network loss. This network loss is determined by the
capacity of the blockage of arcs, c · b, as well as by the marginal network loss, `k > 0. For
each b ∈ B, the network loss amounts to `k(c · b). Player 1 earns `k(c · b) and player 2 loses
the same amount from the network loss.
Player 1 incurs the expense of carrying bads. This expense is determined by the
value of the flow of bads, v · f , as well as by the marginal expense of carrying bads, e > 0.
For each f ∈ F , the expense of carrying bads amounts to e(v · f).
Player 2 earns a constant worth of operating the network, w.
For each (f, b) ∈ F ×B, the payoff function of player 1 is defined as
u1(f, b) = `t(v · f b) + `k(c · b)− e(v · f),
and the payoff function of player 2 is defined as
u2(f, b) = w − `t(v · f b)− `k(c · b).
For each σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆(F ) × ∆(B), the expected payoff functions are u1(σ1, σ2) =
Eσ[u1(f, b)] and u2(σ1, σ2) = Eσ[u2(f, b)]. Since expected payoff functions are unique up
to an affine transformation, without loss of generality, I assume that the marginal network
loss equals to one, that is, `k = 1.
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Results
I analyze the equilibrium behavior of the players in the model. In a Nash equi-
librium each player has no incentive to change his or her strategy. A strategy profile
(σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆(F )×∆(B) is a Nash equilibrium if for each σ′1 ∈ ∆(F ) and each σ′2 ∈ ∆(B),
u1(σ1, σ2) ≥ u1(σ′1, σ2) and u2(σ1, σ2) ≥ u2(σ1, σ′2).
Suppose that the marginal target loss is greater than the marginal expense of
carrying bads.6 The adversary has an incentive to carry bads through the network. Given
this, I want to answer the following questions: Does the agency have any incentive to block
arcs in the network? Which arcs does the agency block? And how often does the agency
block the arcs?
To answer these questions I divide my analysis into three cases depending on
the bound quantity. The bound quantity q is small if q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗, intermediate if
(1/`t)c · b∗ < q ≤ c · b∗, and large if c · b∗ < q.
Denote by fα an acyclic maximum flow with large bound quantity q in network
(N,A, c). Because fα is acyclic,
fα = (fα)b
o
. (II.8)
Because q is large,
v · fα = c · b∗. (II.9)
That is, the value of an acyclic maximum flow equals to the capacity of a minimum cut
blockage. This equality is called the max-flow min-cut theorem.7
6If the marginal target loss is no greater than the marginal expense of carrying bads, the adversary has
no incentive to carry bads through the network from the base to the target. Given this, the agency has no
incentive to block arcs in the network. Thus, any trivial-flow zero-blockage strategy profile (fτ , bo) is a Nash
equilibrium.
7Ford and Fulkerson (14) introduce the maximum flow problem in networks and show the max-flow
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A flow fβ ∈ F is a binding flow if fβ = (q/(c · b∗))fα. Because fα is acyclic, fβ is
also acyclic. That is,
fβ = (fβ)b
o
. (II.10)
In addition the max-flow min-cut theorem (II.9) implies that
v · fβ = q. (II.11)
That is, the value of a binding flow equals to the bound quantity.
First, suppose that the bound quantity is small. We call (fβ, bo) a binding-flow
zero-blockage strategy profile. In any binding-flow zero-blockage strategy profile, if the bound
quantity is small, each player has no incentive to change his or her strategy.
Proposition 1
If the bound quantity is small, that is, if q ≤ (1/`t)c ·b∗, then any binding-flow zero-blockage
strategy profile (fβ , bo) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 1 is presented in Appendix B.
In any binding-flow zero-blockage Nash equilibrium, player 1 carries bads up to
the bound quantity in a dispersed way through the network, but player 2 does not block
any arcs in the network. The following is an example of this equilibrium.
Example 2
Consider network (N,A, c) in Example 1. Notice that fα = (2, 1, 2, 3, 0)′ is the only acyclic
maximum flow and b∗ = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0)′ is the only minimum cut blockage. Also notice that
min-cut theorem. For a detailed discussion see Ahuja et al. (1).
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the capacity of the minimum cut blockage is c·b∗ = 3. Suppose that the marginal target loss
is `t = 2, the marginal expense of carrying bads is e = 1, and the bound quantity is q = 1.
Then the binding flow is fβ = (2/3, 1/3, 2/3, 1, 0)′. Because the bound quantity is small,
the binding-flow zero-blockage strategy profile (fβ, bo) is a Nash equilibrium. However, if
player 1 carries bads up to the bound quantity only through arcs (s, i2) and (i2, t), player
2 has the incentive to block arc (s, i2). 
If the bound quantity is small and player 1 carries bads in a dispersed way through
the network, then player 2 has no incentive to block arcs. However, if the bound quantity
is not small, that is, if the bound quantity is either intermediate or large, then player 2 has
an incentive to block arcs in the network. Now we want to know which arcs player 2 blocks
and how often she blocks them. Consider the following example.
Example 3
Consider network (N,A, c) in Example 1. Suppose that player 2 chooses a cut blockage
b = (1, 1, 0, 0, 0)′, that is, suppose that player 2 blocks all the arcs from the base. Then
player 2 incurs a network loss of 5. However, if player 2 chooses the minimum cut blockage
b∗ = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0)′, she incurs a network loss of 3. Since both b and b∗ are cut blockages, for
each flow f , the net flow is the zero flow, that is, f b = fo and f b
∗
= fo. Thus, the target
loss is zero. Therefore, b is a dominated strategy for player 2. 
In general, if b is a cut blockage but not a minimum cut blockage and b∗ is a
minimum cut blockage, then b is dominated by b∗ for player 2, that is, for each f ∈ F ,
u2(f, b) < u2(f, b∗). Thus, it may be a dominated strategy for player 2 to block all the arcs
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from the base or to block all the arcs into the target. If player 2 blocks arcs, she blocks
minimum cut arcs in the network.
Now imagine that player 2 blocks minimum cut arcs in the network with probability
1. Then player 1 has no incentive to carry bads through the network because he always
fails to reach the target. If player 1 carries no bads to the target with probability 1, player
2 has no incentive to block the arcs. This is because she wants to avoid the network loss if
there is no threat to the target. In turn, if player 2 blocks no arcs with probability 1, player
1 has an incentive to carry bads. If player 1 carries bads with probability 1, player 2 has
an incentive to block arcs. In general, if the bound quantity is either intermediate or large,
there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
To study how often to block minimum cut arcs, I examine the mixed strategy Nash
equilibria of the model. Now, suppose that the bound quantity is large.
A mixed strategy σλ1 ∈ ∆(F ) is a λ-scaled max-flow strategy, or simply a λ-flow
strategy, for player 1 if for some λ ∈ [1/`t, 1], σλ1(f τ ) = 1 − 1/λ`t and σλ1(λfα) = 1/λ`t.
By choosing a λ-flow strategy player 1 chooses a trivial flow f τ with probability 1− 1/λ`t
and a λ-scaled acyclic maximum flow λfα with probability 1/λ`t. For example, if λ = 1,
player 1 carries no bads from the base to the target with probability 1 − 1/`t and carries
the maximum possible amount of bads through the network with probability 1/`t. Here λ
is a scale to adjust the probability and the amount of bads.
A mixed strategy σ∗2 ∈ ∆(B) is a min-cut strategy for player 2 if σ∗2(bo) = e/`t
and σ∗2(b∗) = 1 − e/`t. By choosing a min-cut strategy player 2 chooses the zero blockage
bo with probability e/`t and a minimum cut blockage b∗ with probability 1− e/`t. That is,
player 2 blocks no arcs with probability e/`t and blocks minimum cut arcs with probability
1− e/`t.
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We call (σλ1 , σ
∗
2) a λ-flow min-cut strategy profile.
Notice that player 1 chooses only two pure strategies f τ and λfα with positive
probability. Given that player 2 chooses a min-cut strategy σ∗2, by choosing a trivial flow
f τ , player 1 earns an expected payoff of
u1(f τ , σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(b
o)u1(f τ , bo) + σ∗2(b
∗)u1(f τ , b∗)
= (1− e/`t)(c · b∗),
because player 1 earns u1(f τ , bo) = 0 with probability σ∗2(bo) = e/`t and earns u1(f τ , b∗) =
c ·b∗ with probability σ∗2(b∗) = 1−e/`t. Given a min-cut strategy σ∗2, by choosing a λ-scaled
acyclic maximum flow λfα, player 1 earns an expected payoff of
u1(λfα, σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(b
o)u1(λfα, bo) + σ∗2(b
∗)u1(λfα, b∗)
= (1− e/`t)(c · b∗), (II.12)
because player 1 earns u1(λfα, bo) = (`t − e)(v · λfα) with probability σ∗2(bo) = e/`t and
earns u1(λfα, b∗) = c · b∗− e(v ·λfα) with probability σ∗2(b∗) = 1− e/`t. Thus, u1(f τ , σ∗2) =
u1(λfα, σ∗2). By choosing a min-cut strategy σ∗2, player 2 makes player 1 indifferent between
the two pure strategies f τ and λfα.
Now notice that player 2 chooses only two pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive
probability. Given that player 1 chooses a λ-flow strategy σλ1 , by choosing the zero blockage
bo, player 2 earns an expected payoff of
u2(σλ1 , b
o) = σλ1(f
τ )u2(f τ , bo) + σλ1(λf
α)u2(λfα, bo)
= w − v · fα,
because player 2 earns u2(f τ , bo) = w with probability σλ1(f
τ ) = 1−1/λ`t and u2(λfα, bo) =
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w − λ`t(v · fα) with probability σλ1(λfα) = 1/λ`t. Given a λ-flow strategy σλ1 , by choosing
a minimum cut blockage b∗, player 2 earns an expected payoff of
u2(σλ1 , b
∗) = w − c · b∗, (II.13)
because player 2 earns w − c · b∗ whichever strategy player 1 chooses. Thus, the max-flow
min-cut theorem (II.9) implies that u2(σλ1 , b
o) = u2(σλ1 , b
∗). By choosing a λ-flow strategy
σλ1 , player 1 makes player 2 indifferent between the two pure strategies b
o and b∗.
In addition, we can show that for each player, these pure strategies are at least as
good as any other pure strategies. Thus, in any λ-flow min-cut strategy profile, each player
has no incentive to change his or her strategy.
Proposition 2
If the bound quantity is large, that is, if c · b∗ < q, then any λ-flow min-cut strategy profile
(σλ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 2 is presented in Appendix B. The following is an example
of λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibria.
Example 4
Consider network (N,A, c) in Example 1. Recall that fα = (2, 1, 2, 3, 0)′ is the acyclic
maximum flow and b∗ = (0, 1, 1, 0, 0)′ is the minimum cut blockage. Suppose that `t = 4,
e = 1, and q = 5. Because the bound quantity is large, any λ-flow min-cut strategy
profile (σλ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. For instance, in a λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium
with λ = 1, player 1 chooses the zero flow fo with probability σλ1(f
o) = 3/4 and the
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acyclic maximum flow fα with probability σλ1(f
α) = 1/4, and player 2 chooses the zero
blockage bo with probability σ∗2(bo) = 1/4 and the minimum cut blockage b∗ with probability
σ∗2(b∗) = 3/4. In Figure 2, the bold numbers indicate the acyclic maximum flow, and the
line segments indicate the minimum cut blockage. 
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Figure 2. Maximum Flow and Blockage
In any λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium there is a power law relation between
the probability and the extent of the target loss. In this equilibrium, player 1 successfully
carries bads to the target if and only if player 1 chooses a λ-scaled acyclic maximum flow
λfα and player 2 chooses the zero blockage bo. This joint event takes place with probability
(1/λ`t)(e/`t) = (1/λ)(e)`−2t . Thus, with this probability, the bads carried to the target
cause the target loss. Therefore, in any λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the target loss
probability is pλ = (1/λ)(e)`−2t .
In any λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium, if player 1 successfully carries bads to
the target, the target loss amounts to TLλ = (λ`t)(c · b∗). Because pλ = (1/λ)(e)`−2t and
`t = (1/λ)(1/(c · b∗))TLλ,
pλ = (λ)(e)(c · b∗)2(TLλ)−2 (II.14)
where λ ∈ (1/`t, 1]. Furthermore, if λ = (`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0, 1), equality (II.14) can be
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rewritten as
pλ = (e)(c · b∗)
θ−2
θ−1 (TLλ)
− θ−2
θ−1 (II.15)
because pλ = (e)(`t)θ−2 and `t = (c · b∗)
1
θ−1 (TLλ)
− 1
θ−1 . Thus, in any λ-flow min-cut Nash
equilibrium with λ = (`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0, 1), the target loss probability pλ is a negative
power function of the target loss TLλ. However, if λ = 1/`t, then pλ = (e)`−1t and TLλ =
c · b∗. Thus, if λ = 1/`t, the equilibrium probability pλ is independent of the target loss
TLλ.
Finally, suppose that the bound quantity is intermediate.
A mixed strategy σµ1 ∈ ∆(F ) is a µ-scaled binding-flow strategy, or simply a µ-flow
strategy, for player 1 if for some µ ∈ [(1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗), 1], σµ1 (f τ ) = 1− (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗)
and σµ1 (µf
β) = (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗). By choosing a µ-flow strategy player 1 chooses a
trivial flow f τ with probability 1− (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗) and a µ-scaled binding flow µfβ with
probability (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗). For example, if µ = 1, player 1 carries no bads from the
base to the target with probability 1− (1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗) and carries bads up to the bound
quantity with probability (1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗). Here µ is a scale to adjust the probability and
the amount of bads.
We call (σµ1 , σ
∗
2) a µ-flow min-cut strategy profile.
Notice that player 1 chooses only two pure strategies f τ and µfβ with positive
probability. Given a min-cut strategy σ∗2, by choosing a trivial flow f τ , player 1 earns an
expected payoff of u1(f τ , σ∗2) = (1− e/`t)(c · b∗). Given a min-cut strategy σ∗2, by choosing
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a µ-scaled binding flow µfβ, player 1 earns an expected payoff of
u1(µfβ, σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(b
o)u1(µfβ, bo) + σ∗2(b
∗)u1(µfβ, b∗)
= (1− e/`t)(c · b∗), (II.16)
because player 1 earns u1(µfβ, bo) = (`t − e)(v · µfβ) with probability σ∗2(bo) = e/`t and
earns u1(µfβ , b∗) = c · b∗− e(v ·µfβ) with probability σ∗2(b∗) = 1− e/`t. Thus, u1(f τ , σ∗2) =
u1(µfβ, σ∗2). By choosing a min-cut strategy σ∗2, player 2 makes player 1 indifferent between
the two pure strategies f τ and µfβ.
Now notice that player 2 chooses only two pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive
probability. Given a µ-flow strategy σµ1 , by choosing the zero blockage b
o, player 2 earns an
expected payoff of
u2(σ
µ
1 , b
o) = σµ1 (f
τ )u2(f τ , bo) + σ
µ
1 (µf
β)u2(µfβ , bo)
= w − c · b∗,
because player 2 earns u2(f τ , bo) = w with probability σ
µ
1 (f
τ ) = 1 − (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗)
and earns u2(µfβ , bo) = w − (µ`t)q with probability σµ1 (µfβ) = (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗). Given
a µ-flow strategy σµ1 , by choosing a minimum cut blockage b
∗, player 2 earns an expected
payoff of
u2(σ
µ
1 , b
∗) = w − c · b∗, (II.17)
because player 2 earns w − c · b∗ whichever strategy player 1 chooses. Thus, u2(σµ1 , bo) =
u2(σ
µ
1 , b
∗). By choosing a µ-flow strategy σµ1 , player 1 makes player 2 indifferent between
the two pure strategies bo and b∗.
In addition, we can show that for each player, these pure strategies are at least as
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good as any other pure strategies. Thus, in any µ-flow min-cut strategy profile, each player
has no incentive to change his or her strategy.
Proposition 3
If the bound quantity is intermediate, that is, if (1/`t)c · b∗ < q ≤ c · b∗, then any µ-flow
min-cut strategy profile (σµ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium.
The proof of Proposition 3 is presented in Appendix B. The following is an example
of µ-flow min-cut Nash equilibria.
Example 5
Consider network (N,A, c) in Example 1. Suppose that `t = 4, e = 1, and q = 3/2. Notice
that the binding flow is fβ = (1, 1/2, 1, 3/2, 0)′. Because the bound quantity is intermediate,
any µ-flow min-cut strategy profile (σµ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. For instance, in a µ-flow
min-cut Nash equilibrium with µ = 1, player 1 chooses the zero flow fo with probability
σµ1 (f
o) = 1/2 and the binding flow fβ with probability σµ1 (f
β) = 1/2, and player 2 chooses
the zero blockage bo with probability σ∗2(bo) = 1/4 and the minimum cut blockage b∗ with
probability σ∗2(b∗) = 3/4. In Figure 3, the bold numbers indicate the binding flow, and the
line segments indicate the minimum cut blockage. 
In any µ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium the probability and the extent of the target
loss show a power law relation. In this equilibrium, player 1 successfully carries bads to the
target if and only if player 1 chooses a µ-scaled binding flow µfβ and player 2 chooses the
zero blockage bo. This joint event takes place with probability (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e/`t) =
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Figure 3. Binding Flow and Blockage
(1/µ)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e)`−2t . Thus, in any µ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium, the target loss
probability is pµ = (1/µ)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e)`−2t .
In any µ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium, if player 1 successfully carries bads to the
target, the target loss amounts to TLµ = (µ`t)q. Because pµ = (1/µ)(1/q)(c · b∗)(e)`−2t and
`t = (1/µ)(1/q)TLµ,
pµ = (µ)(e)(q)(c · b∗)(TLµ)−2 (II.18)
where µ ∈ ((1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗), 1]. Furthermore, if µ = (q)−θ(c · b∗)θ(`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0, 1),
equality (II.18) can be rewritten as
pµ = (e)(q)(c · b∗)−
1
θ−1 (TLµ)
− θ−2
θ−1 (II.19)
because pµ = (e)(q)θ−1(c · b∗)1−θ(`t)θ−2 and `t = (q)−1(c · b∗)
θ
θ−1 (TLµ)
− 1
θ−1 . Thus, in any
µ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium with µ = (q)−θ(c · b∗)θ(`t)−θ for some θ ∈ [0, 1), the
target loss probability pµ is a negative power function of the target loss TLµ. However, if
µ = (1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗), then pµ = (e)`−1t and TLµ = c · b∗. Thus, if µ = (1/`t)(1/q)(c · b∗),
the equilibrium probability pµ is independent of the target loss TLµ.
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Discussion
First I relate my results to empirical studies on terrorist events and then discuss
related research in progress and further directions.
Fatality Distribution
Let z denote the number of fatalities in a terrorist event and let p(z) denote the
frequency of a terrorist event in which the number of fatalities is z. The fatality distribution
of terrorist events follows a power law if for each z ≥ zmin,
p(z) ∝ z−γ
where zmin and γ are the parameters of the distribution. The estimates of the parameters
are derived from data and denoted by zˆmin and γˆ.
Recent empirical studies show that the fatality distribution of terrorist events
follows a power law. Clauset et al. (11) use the database of National Memorial Institute
for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) and conclude that the fatality distribution follows
a power law. The estimate of the scaling parameter is γˆ = 2.38. Bohorquez et al. (5)
construct a data set on insurgent wars and conclude that for each insurgent war the fatality
distribution follows a power law. The estimates of the scaling parameter are clustered
around 2.5.
Recall that in any λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium with λ = (`t)−θ for some
θ ∈ [0, 1), the target loss probability pλ is a negative power function of the target loss TLλ.
Precisely, from equality (II.15),
pλ = (e)(c · b∗)
θ−2
θ−1 (TLλ)
− θ−2
θ−1 ,
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which can be rewritten as
pλ(TLλ) ∝ (TLλ)
− θ−2
θ−1 .
To link this theoretical finding and empirical evidence I make two additional assumptions.
Suppose that the target loss is measured by the number of fatalities and that the target
loss probability is proportional to the frequency of a terrorist event.
Now suppose that the estimate of the scaling parameter, γˆ ≥ 2, is derived from
data. By setting γˆ = θˆ−2
θˆ−1 and solving for θˆ, we have θˆ =
γˆ−2
γˆ−1 . Notice that θˆ ∈ [0, 1).
Therefore, in the λ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium with λ = (`t)−θˆ, the fatality distribution
is predicted to be
pλ(TLλ) ∝ (TLλ)−γˆ
and is consistent with data. Similarly, in the µ-flow min-cut Nash equilibrium with µ =
(q)−θˆ(c · b∗)θˆ(`t)−θˆ, the predicted fatality distribution, pµ(TLµ) ∝ (TLµ)−γˆ , is consistent
with data.
Further Research
This paper presents a strategic model of network interdiction where two players
have complete information and simultaneously choose their strategies. Building on this
research we can study a model with incomplete information where players may not know
each other’s type. For example, a security agency may not know the strategies and payoffs of
an adversary. This extension to incomplete information is, in my view, of clear importance.
We can also study a model where players sequentially choose their strategies. For example,
a security agency may observe an adversary’s plots and choose her own strategy conditional
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on this observation or, alternatively, the agency may move first in setting up a security
system. Both these approaches are subjects of my current and future planned research.
Appendix A
In this appendix I provide the flow decomposition algorithm.8 A network is given
as (N,A, c). For each f ∈ F , we can find a vector x = (xh)′h∈H such that f =Mx. Initially
we are given a flow f and the zero vector x. At each step, construct a sequence of distinct
nodes, and obtain either an s − t path or a cycle. Then we modify vector x and flow f .
This algorithm terminates when the modified flow is the zero flow.
Algorithm 1 Flow Decomposition
Let f = (fij)′(i,j)∈A ∈ F be given. Let x = (xh)′h∈H be the vector of zeros.
At Step k = 1, 2, . . . , if f is the zero flow, this algorithm terminates and yields vector x. If
f is not the zero flow, there is an arc (i, j) ∈ A with fij > 0.
(i) Start from base s. If there is (i1, i2) ∈ A with i1 = s and fi1i2 > 0, begin the construction
of a sequence of distinct nodes with the two nodes i1 and i2. If there is (i2, i3) ∈ A with
fi2i3 > 0, add node i3 to the sequence. Repeat this until we add target t or a previously
added node to the sequence. In the former case, an s− t path is obtained and, in the latter
case, a cycle is obtained. Denote the outcome by h ∈ H. Replace xh = 0 with the minimum
flow of the arcs included in h. Also, replace fij with fij − xh if h includes (i, j). Proceed to
the next step.
8See Ahuja et al. (1) and Ford and Fulkerson (14) for reference.
28
(ii) If there is no (i1, i2) ∈ A with i1 = s and fi1i2 > 0, find another arc (i, j) with fij > 0.
Start from node i. By applying the argument in (i), we obtain a cycle and modify vector x
and flow f . Proceed to the next step. 
Appendix B
Lemma 1
For each (f, b) ∈ F ×B, it holds that v · f bo − v · f b ≤ c · b.
Proof. Let f ∈ F be any flow. Because f bo is the net flow of bads to the target under flow
f and the zero blockage bo, for each (i, j) ∈ A, we have f boij ≤ cij . Thus, blocking arc (i, j)
decreases the value of the net flow by at most cij . Therefore, for each b = (bij)′(i,j)∈A ∈ B,
we have v · f bo − v · f b ≤∑(i,j)∈A cijbij . 
Lemma 2
If fα is an acyclic maximum flow with large bound quantity q in network (N,A, c), for
each b ∈ B, it holds that v · fα − v · (fα)b ≤ c · b. Furthermore, if q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗ and fβ
is a binding flow, for each b ∈ B, it holds that `t(v · fβ)− `t(v · (fβ)b) ≤ c · b.
Proof. Lemma 1 implies that for each b ∈ B, v · (fα)bo − v · (fα)b ≤ c · b. Because
fα = (fα)b
o
from equality (II.8), we have v · fα − v · (fα)b ≤ c · b. Now multiplying both
sides by (`t)(q/(c·b∗)), we have (`t)(q/(c·b∗))(v ·fα−v ·(fα)b) ≤ (`t)(q/(c·b∗))(c·b). Because
fβ is a binding flow and fβ = (q/(c · b∗))fα, we have (`t)(q/(c · b∗))(v · fα − v · (fα)b) =
`t(v · fβ)− `t(v · (fβ)b). Because q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗, we have (`t)(q/(c · b∗))(c · b) ≤ c · b. Thus,
for each b ∈ B, we have `t(v · fβ)− `t(v · (fβ)b) ≤ c · b. 
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Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that q ≤ (1/`t)c · b∗. We show that in any binding-
flow zero-blockage strategy profile (fβ, bo) each player has no incentive to change his or her
strategy. Since (fβ)b
o
= fβ from equality (II.10) and v · fβ = q from equality (II.11), we
have u1(fβ, bo) = (`t − e)q. Suppose that player 1 chooses any flow f . Since v · f bo ≤ v · f
and v · f ≤ q,
u1(f, bo) = `t(v · f bo) + c · bo − e(v · f)
≤ `t(v · f)− e(v · f)
≤ (`t − e)q.
Thus, player 1 has no incentive to change his strategy. Since (fβ)b
o
= fβ from equality
(II.10) and v · fβ = q from equality (II.11), we have u2(fβ, bo) = w − (`t)q. Suppose that
player 2 chooses any blockage b. Since `t(v · fβ) − `t(v · (fβ)b) ≤ c · b from Lemma 2 and
v · fβ = q from equality (II.11),
u2(fβ, b) = w − `t(v · (fβ)b)− c · b
≤ w − `t(v · fβ)
= w − (`t)q.
Thus, player 2 has no incentive to change her strategy. Therefore, (fβ , bo) is a Nash equi-
librium. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that c · b∗ < q. In any λ-flow min-cut strategy profile
(σλ1 , σ
∗
2) player 1 chooses only two pure strategies f
τ and λfα with positive probability and
player 2 chooses only two pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive probability. In addition
each player is indifferent between the two pure strategies played with positive probability.
Thus, to show that (σλ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that (i) for each f ∈ F ,
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u1(λfα, σ∗2) ≥ u1(f, σ∗2) and (ii) for each b ∈ B, u2(σλ1 , b∗) ≥ u2(σλ1 , b).
(i) We show that for each f ∈ F , u1(λfα, σ∗2) ≥ u1(f, σ∗2). Let f ∈ F be any flow.
Calculate player 1’s payoffs. Since v · f bo ≤ v · f ,
u1(f, bo) = `t(v · f bo) + c · bo − e(v · f)
≤ (`t − e)(v · f).
Since v · f b∗ = 0,
u1(f, b∗) = `t(v · f b∗) + c · b∗ − e(v · f)
= c · b∗ − e(v · f).
Since σ∗2(bo) = e/`t and σ∗2(b∗) = 1− e/`t,
u1(f, σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(b
o)u1(f, bo) + σ∗2(b
∗)u1(f, b∗)
≤ (e/`t)(`t − e)(v · f) + (1− e/`t)(c · b∗ − e(v · f))
= (1− e/`t)(c · b∗).
From (II.12) we know that u1(λfα, σ∗2) = (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗). Thus, for each f ∈ F ,
u1(λfα, σ∗2) ≥ u1(f, σ∗2).
(ii) We show that for each b ∈ B, u2(σλ1 , b∗) ≥ u2(σλ1 , b). Let b ∈ B be any
blockage. Calculate player 2’s payoffs. Since v · (f τ )b = 0,
u2(f τ , b) = w − `t(v · (f τ )b)− c · b
= w − c · b.
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Since v · (λfα)b = λ(v · (fα)b),
u2(λfα, b) = w − `t(v · (λfα)b)− c · b
= w − λ`t(v · (fα)b)− c · b.
Since σλ1(f
τ ) = 1− 1/λ`t, σλ1(λfα) = 1/λ`t, and v · fα − v · (fα)b ≤ c · b from Lemma 2,
u2(σλ1 , b) = σ
λ
1(f
τ )u2(f τ , b) + σλ1(λf
α)u2(λfα, b)
= (1− 1/λ`t)(w − c · b) + (1/λ`t)(w − λ`t(v · (fα)b)− c · b)
= w − c · b− v · (fα)b
≤ w − v · fα.
Then the max-flow min-cut theorem (II.9) implies that u2(σλ1 , b) ≤ w − c · b∗. From (II.13)
we know that u2(σλ1 , b
∗) = w − c · b∗. Thus, for each b ∈ B, u2(σλ1 , b∗) ≥ u2(σλ1 , b).
Therefore, (σλ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that (1/`t)c · b∗ < q ≤ c · b∗. In any µ-flow min-cut
strategy profile (σµ1 , σ
∗
2) player 1 chooses only two pure strategies f
τ and µfβ with positive
probability and player 2 chooses only two pure strategies bo and b∗ with positive probability.
In addition each player is indifferent between the two pure strategies played with positive
probability. Thus, to show that (σµ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium, it suffices to show that (i)
for each f ∈ F , u1(µfβ , σ∗2) ≥ u1(f, σ∗2) and (ii) for each b ∈ B, u2(σµ1 , b∗) ≥ u2(σµ1 , b).
(i) We show that for each f ∈ F , u1(µfβ, σ∗2) ≥ u1(f, σ∗2). Let f ∈ F be any flow.
Calculate player 1’s payoffs. Since v · f bo ≤ v · f ,
u1(f, bo) = `t(v · f bo) + c · bo − e(v · f)
≤ (`t − e)(v · f).
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Since v · f b∗ = 0,
u1(f, b∗) = `t(v · f b∗) + c · b∗ − e(v · f)
= c · b∗ − e(v · f).
Since σ∗2(bo) = e/`t and σ∗2(b∗) = 1− e/`t,
u1(f, σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(b
o)u1(f, bo) + σ∗2(b
∗)u1(f, b∗)
≤ (e/`t)(`t − e)(v · f) + (1− e/`t)(c · b∗ − e(v · f))
= (1− e/`t)(c · b∗).
From (II.16) we know that u1(µfβ, σ∗2) = (1 − e/`t)(c · b∗). Thus, for each f ∈ F ,
u1(µfβ, σ∗2) ≥ u1(f, σ∗2).
(ii) We show that for each b ∈ B, u2(σµ1 , b∗) ≥ u2(σµ1 , b). Let b ∈ B be any
blockage. Calculate player 2’s payoffs. Since v · (f τ )b = 0,
u2(f τ , b) = w − `t(v · (f τ )b)− c · b
= w − c · b.
Since v · (µfβ)b = µ(v · (fβ)b),
u2(µfβ, b) = w − `t(v · (µfβ)b)− c · b
= w − µ`t(v · (fβ)b)− c · b.
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Since σµ1 (f
τ ) = 1 − (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗), σµ1 (µfβ) = (1/µ`t)(1/q)(c · b∗), and v · (fβ)b =
(q/(c · b∗))(v · (fα)b),
u2(σ
µ
1 , b) = σ
µ
1 (f
τ )u2(f τ , b) + σ
µ
1 (µf
β)u2(µfβ, b)
= w − c · b− (1/q)(c · b∗)(v · (fβ)b)
= w − c · b− (1/q)(c · b∗)(q/(c · b∗))(v · (fα)b)
= w − c · b− v · (fα)b
≤ w − v · fα.
The last inequality comes from Lemma 2. Then the max-flow min-cut theorem (II.9) implies
that u2(σ
µ
1 , b) ≤ w − c · b∗. From (II.17) we know that u2(σµ1 , b∗) = w − c · b∗. Thus, for
each b ∈ B, u2(σµ1 , b∗) ≥ u2(σµ1 , b).
Therefore, (σµ1 , σ
∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium. 
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CHAPTER III
NETWORK BADS: HOW BOTTLENECKS MATTER
Introduction
When there is transmission of bads through a network, the structure of the net-
work affects the behavior of economic players. Players may want to control the source
of bads or the bottlenecks of the network. The structure of the network determines the
bottlenecks, and in turn, the bottlenecks determine the transmission of bads through the
network. Therefore, by controlling the bottlenecks, players can control the transmission of
bads. However, players behave strategically and equilibrium outcomes may not be efficient.
For example, when water pollutants are carried through rivers and pipelines, public
agencies can view the whole system of rivers and pipelines as a network and manage the
bottlenecks of the network. They can also manage the source of pollution. If public agencies
manage the source and the network separately, they may not take action that leads to
efficient outcomes.1
Cooperative approaches through transfers between players can help achieve effi-
cient outcomes. Sharing human resources and monetary funds can be examples of transfers.
During the outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, by sharing
human resources, public health agencies worked together to prevent the disease. Also, in
the ongoing debt crisis, European governments are seeking cooperative agreements includ-
1When infectious diseases are transmitted through social networks between individuals, public agencies
may want to control social networks to reduce the transmission of diseases. For studies on disease control,
see Glass et al. (17) and Viboud et al. (38). When liquidity shocks are contagious through financial networks
between banks, liquid banks may want to control financial networks to reduce the contagion of shocks. For
studies on financial contagion, see Allen and Gale (2) and Leitner (26).
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ing the creation and expansion of a bailout fund, the European Financial Stability Facility
(EFSF), to resolve the crisis.
This paper examines a model where bads arise at a source node and may be
transmitted to a sink node through a network. Two players, player 1 and player 2, wish
to decrease the extent of bads transmitted to the sink node. Player 1 can act to mitigate
the Extent of Bads at the Source (EBS) while player 2 can act to reduce the Maximum
Transmission of Bads (MTB) through the network. The minimum of the mitigated EBS
and the reduced MTB is assumed to determine the extent of bads transmitted to the sink
node, which is called the extent of network bads. Each player incurs the cost of action but
benefits from the decrease in the extent of network bads. Each player’s action to decrease
the extent of network bads can be viewed as a public good.
I characterize efficient strategy profiles and equilibria in terms of the bottlenecks
of the network and the extent of bads at the source, as well as costs and benefits. In an
efficient profile the joint payoff is maximized. In an equilibrium each player maximizes his
own payoff given the other player’s strategy.
In every efficient profile and in every equilibrium, either (a) player 1 acts to mit-
igate the EBS or (b) player 2 acts to reduce the MTB through the network or (c) neither
player acts. Because the minimum of the mitigated EBS and the reduced MTB determines
the extent of network bads, it is neither an efficient profile nor an equilibrium for both
players to act. Thus, one player may free-ride on the other player’s action. In case (a),
player 2 free-rides on player 1’s action. In case (b), player 1 free-rides on player 2’s action.
If either player 1 or player 2 acts, in an efficient profile, the marginal cost of action
equals to the marginal joint loss from network bads, whereas in an equilibrium, the marginal
cost equals to the marginal private loss. Thus, in case (a) and in case (b), the equilibrium
36
level of action is less than the efficient level.
For further comparison, my analysis is divided into three cases depending on the
bottleneck capacity. In a network a bottleneck is an arc used to its capacity when the max-
imum transmission occurs. The total capacity of bottlenecks, or the bottleneck capacity,
determines the maximum transmission of bads through the network. Whether the bottle-
neck capacity is small, intermediate, or large depends on the extent of bads at the source
and the efficient level of action.
If the bottleneck capacity is small, the maximum transmission of bads (MTB) is
less than the extent of bads at the source (EBS) mitigated to the efficient level. Thus,
even if player 1 mitigates the EBS to the efficient level, the extent of network bads does
not decrease. Similarly, when he mitigates to the equilibrium level, the extent does not
decrease. Therefore, in every efficient profile and in every equilibrium, player 1 does not
act at all. Either (b) player 2 acts or (c) neither player acts.
If the bottleneck capacity is large, the EBS is less than or equal to the MTB
reduced to the efficient level. Thus, even if player 2 reduces the MTB to the efficient level,
the extent of network bads does not decrease. Therefore, in every efficient profile, player
2 does not act at all. Either (a) player 1 acts or (c) neither player acts. However, in
equilibrium, player 1 always acts. That is, there is no equilibrium where player 2 acts or
neither player acts.
If the bottleneck capacity is intermediate, the MTB is greater than or equal to
the EBS mitigated to the efficient level, and the EBS is greater than the MTB reduced
to the efficient level. Thus, both players can decrease the extent of network bads to the
efficient level. In every efficient profile, either (a) player 1 acts or (b) player 2 acts. Costs
and benefits determine who takes action in an efficient profile. However, in equilibrium,
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both players may take no action or wrong action while they try to free-ride on each other’s
action. Specifically, there may be an inefficient equilibrium where neither player acts. More
interestingly, the player who acts in an equilibrium may not be the player who must act
in the efficient profile. That is, the efficient player may not act in equilibrium. Overall,
strategic inaction leads to inefficiency.
Unless there is an efficient equilibrium where neither player acts, no efficient profile
is an equilibrium and no equilibrium is efficient. Thus, players 1 and 2 may not have
incentives to choose an efficient profile. To provide incentives for efficiency, I introduce
cooperative solutions, where players 1 and 2 jointly choose an efficient profile and make
transfers to each other. Each player is better off by using a cooperative solution than by
maximizing his payoff alone. I show that such cooperative solutions always exist. Therefore,
both players can always achieve efficiency by using cooperative solutions. If the bottleneck
capacity is intermediate, in every cooperative solution, the efficient player acts to decrease
the extent of network bads and gets a positive net transfer from the other.
The contribution of this chapter is threefold.
First, this chapter contributes to the literature on public goods in networks by
considering public bads transmitted through networks. Public goods, and also public bads,
are transmitted through various networks. Knowledge and information can be examples of
public goods.2 Infectious diseases and liquidity shocks can be examples of public bads. In
the literature there are two different approaches: The network interaction approach assumes
that networks are given and fixed; the network formation approach assumes that networks
are chosen by players. Bramoulle´ and Kranton (6) is an example of the former; Galeotti
2Conley and Udry (12) show how farmers learn agricultural practices from other farmers.
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and Goyal (16) is an example of the latter.3 A third approach is explored in this chapter:
A network is given but not fixed. Some player may have limited discretion to control the
network. For example, suppose that a disease breaks out in one area connected through a
transportation network. This disease can be transmitted through the network to another
area. An agency may want to reduce the transmission of the disease by controlling the
network. The agency’s efforts to reduce the transmission can be viewed as public goods in
the network.
Second, this chapter contributes to the literature on adversarial networks by in-
troducing non-adversarial players. While these players are affected by network bads, they
have different tools to deal with the bads. Thus, it is important to coordinate the players’
behavior to achieve better outcomes. In the literature, however, it is assumed that players
are adversarial. Washburn and Wood (40) study a zero-sum game between an evader and
an interdictor in a given network. The evader chooses a path to move through the network
while the interdictor chooses an arc in the network to stop the evader. Baccara and Bar-
Isaac (3) study a game between a law enforcement agency and a criminal organization. The
agency allocates its resources to detect criminals while the criminals form an organization to
carry out illegal activities. In this chapter, players are non-adversarial. Players coordinate
with each other to decrease network bads. Cooperative solutions are studied to help the
coordination.
Third, this chapter contributes to the literature on flow games by introducing
strategic behavior. Kalai and Zemel (24) introduce a coalitional game, called a flow game,
where the worth of a coalition is defined as the value of a maximum flow through the
network restricted to the members of the coalition. Every flow game is totally balanced
3Cho (9) also studies a network model for public goods. For a review of the literature, see Goyal (18)
and Jackson (23).
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and thus has a non-empty core. A minimum cut is used to find a core allocation.4 In this
chapter, players make strategic choices to decrease the extent of network bads, which is
constrained by the value of a maximum flow through a network. Equilibrium strategies, as
well as efficient strategies, are constructed on the concept of a minimum cut.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a strategic net-
work model. Section 3 analyzes efficient profiles and equilibria and introduces cooperative
solutions. Section 4 concludes.
Model
Let N := {1, 2, . . . , n} be the set of nodes with n ≥ 2. Node 1 is called the source
and node n is called the sink. Let A ⊆ {(i, j) ∈ N × N : i 6= j} be the set of arcs, where
each arc is an ordered pair of distinct nodes. Each arc (i, j) is directed from node i to node
j. The Extent of Bads at the Source (EBS) is described by a number x > 0. These bads
are transmitted through an arc from one node to another node. For each (i, j) ∈ A, the
maximum transmission of bads through arc (i, j) from node i to node j is described by a
number yij > 0, which is called the capacity of arc (i, j).5 Let y := (yij)(i,j)∈A be the vector
of arc capacities. The collection (N,A, y) is called a network.
Two players, player 1 and player 2, wish to decrease the extent of bads transmitted
to the sink. Both players choose their strategies simultaneously and independently.
Player 1 can act to mitigate the extent of bads at the source. Player 1 chooses
a mitigation strategy m with 0 ≤ m ≤ x. The set of mitigation strategies for player 1 is
4For studies on flow games, see Granot and Granot (20), Kalai and Zemel (25), Potters et al. (34), and
Reijnierse et al. (35). Also, see Granot and Maschler (21) and Van den Nouweland et al. (37) for related
studies on spanning network games.
5This capacity can be viewed as a plausible upper bound for the transmission of bads through arc (i, j).
For a discussion of plausible upper bounds in risk analysis, see Pate´-Cornell (33).
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denoted by M . By choosing m ∈M , player 1 mitigates the extent of bads at the source to
x−m.
Player 2 can act to reduce the maximum transmission of bads through network
(N,A, y). Player 2 chooses a reduction strategy r := (rij)(i,j)∈A with 0 ≤ rij ≤ yij for
each (i, j) ∈ A. The set of reduction strategies for player 2 is denoted by R. By choosing
r = (rij)(i,j)∈A ∈ R, player 2 reduces the maximum transmission of bads through arc (i, j)
to yij − rij .
For each (m, r) ∈M ×R, the extent of bads transmitted to the sink is called the
extent of network bads and denoted by e(m, r). How to define e(m, r) will be explained
later.
Both players lose l(e(m, r)) from e(m, r), where l(·) is a loss function with l(0) = 0.
In other words, both players benefit from the decrease in the extent of network bads.
However, each player incurs the cost of action. Player 1 pays c1(m) for m ∈ M , where
c1(·) is a mitigation cost function with c1(0) = 0. Player 2 pays c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
for
r = (rij)(i,j)∈A ∈ R, where
∑
(i,j)∈A rij is the capacity of reduction strategy r, and c2(·)
is a reduction cost function with c2(0) = 0. Assume that l(·), c1(·), and c2(·) are twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, and strictly convex. That is, l′(·) > 0, l′′(·) >
0, c′1(·) > 0, c′′1(·) > 0, c′2(·) > 0, and c′′2(·) > 0. Players earn a constant worth w.
For each (m, r) ∈M ×R, the payoff of player 1 is
u1(m, r) = w − c1(m)− l(e(m, r))
and the payoff of player 2 is
u2(m, r) = w − c2
 ∑
(i,j)∈A
rij
− l(e(m, r)).
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Here the transmission of bads creates a public bad. Both mitigation strategy and reduction
strategy are public goods to decrease the public bad.
A strategy m˜ ∈ M is a best response of player 1 to r ∈ R if for each m ∈ M ,
u1(m˜, r) ≥ u1(m, r). For each r ∈ R, let BR1(r) ⊆ M be the set of player 1’s best
responses to r. A strategy r˜ ∈ R is a best response of player 2 to m ∈ M if for each
r ∈ R, u2(m, r˜) ≥ u2(m, r). For each m ∈M , let BR2(m) ⊆ R be the set of player 2’s best
responses to m. A strategy profile (m˜, r˜) ∈M ×R is an equilibrium if m˜ is a best response
to r˜ and r˜ is a best response to m˜.
For each (m, r) ∈M×R, the joint payoff is U(m, r) = 2w−c1(m)−c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
−
2l(e(m, r)). A strategy profile (m˜, r˜) ∈ M × R is efficient if for each (m, r) ∈ M × R,
U(m˜, r˜) ≥ U(m, r). That is, an efficient (strategy) profile maximizes the joint payoff.
Now I define e(m, r) the extent of network bads. The transmission of bads from
the source to the sink is modeled as a flow through a network. Formally, for each r ∈ R,
a flow through network (N,A, y − r) is a vector f := (fij)(i,j)∈A satisfying the following
constraints:
0 ≤ fij ≤ yij − rij for each (i, j) ∈ A; (III.1)
fi1 = 0 for each (i, 1) ∈ A; (III.2)
fni = 0 for each (n, i) ∈ A; (III.3)∑
j:(j,i)∈A
fji =
∑
j:(i,j)∈A
fij for each i ∈ N \ {1, n}. (III.4)
Constraint (III.1) says that each arc flow fij is non-negative and constrained by the reduced
arc capacity yij − rij . Constraint (III.2) says that there is no arc flow to the source.
Constraint (III.3) says that there is no arc flow from the sink. Constraint (III.4) says that
at each node i, except for the source and the sink, the total arc flow to node i equals to the
42
total arc flow from node i. That is, there is no change in the total arc flow at node i 6= 1, n.
For each r ∈ R, let F (r) be the set of all flows through network (N,A, y − r).
For each r ∈ R, the value of a maximum flow through network (N,A, y − r) is
defined as
f(r) = max
∑
(i,n)∈A
fin (III.5)
subject to f ∈ F (r).
That is, f(r) is the maximum total arc flow to the sink through network (N,A, y − r).
The value of a maximum flow through network (N,A, y − r) is also called the Maximum
Transmission of Bads (MTB).
For each (m, r) ∈M ×R, the extent of network bads is defined as
e(m, r) = min{x−m, f(r)}.
That is, the extent of network bads is the minimum of x−m, the mitigated extent of bads at
the source, and f(r), the reduced maximum transmission of bads. For each (m, r) ∈M×R,
if x−m ≤ f(r), the extent of network bads is e(m, r) = x−m. If f(r) ≤ x−m, however,
the extent of network bads is e(m, r) = f(r).
The following example shows how to find the extent of network bads.
Example 6
Suppose that a network is given as (N,A, y), where N = {1, 2, 3, 4} is the set of nodes,
A = {(1, 2), (1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4), (3, 4)} is the set of arcs, and y = (y12, y13, y23, y24, y34) =
(50, 10, 10, 10, 50) is the vector of arc capacities. The extent of bads at the source is given as
x = 36. Suppose that player 1 chooses a mitigation strategy m = 16 and player 2 chooses a
reduction strategy r = (r12, r13, r23, r24, r34) = (10, 10, 0, 0, 0). Thus, x−m = 20 and y−r =
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(40, 0, 10, 10, 50). Note that there is a unique maximum flow f = (f12, f13, f23, f24, f34) =
(20, 0, 10, 10, 10) through network (N,A, y−r). The value of the maximum flow is f(r) = 20.
Thus, the extent of network bads is e(m, r) = 20. In Figure 4 each solid circle indicates a
node and each arrow indicates an arc. In each pair of numbers the first bold number shows
the maximum flow and the second light number shows the reduced arc capacity. 
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Figure 4. Maximum Flow
The vector of zeros 0 is called the zero reduction strategy. The value of a maximum
flow through network (N,A, y) is denoted by f(0).
A cut C := (C1, Cn) is an ordered partition of the node set N with 1 ∈ C1 and
n ∈ Cn. For each cut C = (C1, Cn), an arc (i, j) ∈ A is a cut arc of C if i ∈ C1 and j ∈ Cn.
For each cut C = (C1, Cn), let A(C) := {(i, j) ∈ A : i ∈ C1 and j ∈ Cn} be the set of all
cut arcs of C.
For each cut C, the value of a maximum flow through network (N,A, y) is less
than or equal to the total capacity of cut arcs of C. Formally, for each cut C, it holds that
f(0) ≤
∑
(i,j)∈A(C)
yij . (III.6)
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For each r ∈ R, a cut Cr is a minimum cut in (N,A, y − r) if for each cut C,
∑
(i,j)∈A(Cr)
yij − rij ≤
∑
(i,j)∈A(C)
yij − rij . (III.7)
The left hand side of inequality (III.7) is called the capacity of a minimum cut in (N,A, y−r).
A minimum cut in a network determines the bottlenecks of the network. For each
r ∈ R, if Cr is a minimum cut in network (N,A, y − r), then A(Cr) is the set of all cut
arcs of Cr. Each cut arc (i, j) ∈ A(Cr) is called a bottleneck of network (N,A, y − r). The
capacity of a minimum cut is also called the bottleneck capacity.
The max-flow min-cut theorem says that for each r ∈ R, the value of a maximum
flow through network (N,A, y−r) equals to the capacity of a minimum cut in the network.6
Formally, for each r ∈ R, it holds that
f(r) =
∑
(i,j)∈A(Cr)
yij − rij . (III.8)
In other words, the maximum transmission of bads through network (N,A, y− r) equals to
the bottleneck capacity of the network.
From inequality (III.6) and the max-flow min-cut theorem (III.8), for each r ∈ R,
we can show that
f(0)− f(r) ≤
∑
(i,j)∈A
rij . (III.9)
A reduction strategy r ∈ R is a bottleneck reduction strategy if there is a minimum
cut C in network (N,A, y) such that for each (i, j) ∈ A(C), rij > 0, and for each (i, j) /∈
A(C), rij = 0. Note that each cut arc (i, j) ∈ A(C) is a bottleneck of network (N,A, y) and
player 2 reduces the maximum transmission of bads through the bottlenecks.
6Ford and Fulkerson (14) introduce the maximum flow problem (III.5) and show the max-flow min-cut
theorem. For a detailed discussion, see Ahuja et al. (1).
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From the max-flow min-cut theorem (III.8), if r ∈ R is a bottleneck reduction
strategy, we can show that
∑
(i,j)∈A
rij = f(0)− f(r). (III.10)
The following is an example of a bottleneck reduction strategy.
Example 7
Consider network (N,A, y) in Example 6. There is a unique minimum cut C = ({1, 2}, {3, 4})
in network (N,A, y). The set of all cut arcs of C is A(C) = {(1, 3), (2, 3), (2, 4)}. Suppose
that player 2 chooses a bottleneck reduction strategy r = (0, 10, 5, 5, 0). The value of a
maximum flow through network (N,A, y − r) is f(r) = 10. In Figure 5, the bold numbers
indicate the maximum flow, and the light numbers indicate the reduced arc capacities. 
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Figure 5. Bottleneck Reduction Strategy
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Analysis
I want to analyze strategic behavior in my model. Specifically, how does network
(N,A, y) affect strategic behavior? How much mitigation and reduction do players choose?
Do players have incentives for efficiency? To answer these questions, I characterize efficient
(strategy) profiles and equilibria.
Recall that x is the extent of bads at the source and f(0) is the maximum trans-
mission of bads through network (N,A, y). I make two assumptions on the loss and cost
functions.
(A1) The marginal private loss at x is greater than the marginal mitigation cost at 0, i.e.,
l′(x) > c′1(0). The marginal joint loss at 0 is less than the marginal mitigation cost at
x, i.e., 2l′(0) < c′1(x).
(A2) The marginal private loss at f(0) is greater than the marginal reduction cost at 0,
i.e., l′(f(0)) > c′2(0). The marginal joint loss at 0 is less than the marginal reduction
cost at f(0), i.e., 2l′(0) < c′2 (f(0)).
Efficient Profiles
There are two necessary conditions for efficient profiles. In every efficient profile
there is at most one player who acts to decrease the extent of network bads.
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Remark 1
For each (m, r) ∈M ×R, if both players act, that is, if m 6= 0 and r 6= 0, then (m, r) is not
efficient. To see this, let (m, r) ∈M ×R be such that m 6= 0 and r 6= 0. Consider two cases.
First, if x−m ≤ f(r), then e(m, r) = x−m and U(m, r) = 2w−c1(m)−c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
−
2l(x−m). Because c2(·) is strictly increasing and r 6= 0, we have U(m, r) < U(m, 0). Second,
if f(r) ≤ x−m, then e(m, r) = f(r) and U(m, r) = 2w−c1(m)−c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
−2l(f(r)).
Because c1(·) is strictly increasing and m 6= 0, we have U(m, r) < U(0, r). In both cases,
(m, r) is not efficient. Henceforth, we only consider (m, r) ∈M ×R with m = 0 or r = 0 or
both. 
From inequality (III.9), for each r ∈ R, it holds that ∑(i,j)∈A rij ≥ f(0) − f(r).
If (m, r) is an efficient profile such that f(r) ≤ x −m, then ∑(i,j)∈A rij = f(0) − f(r). In
words, there is no wasted reduction capacity to decrease the extent of network bads.
Remark 2
For each (m, r) ∈ M × R with f(r) ≤ x − m, if ∑(i,j)∈A rij > f(0) − f(r), then (m, r)
is not efficient. To see this, let (m, r) ∈ M × R be such that ∑(i,j)∈A rij > f(0) − f(r).
Also, let (m, r˜) ∈M ×R be such that ∑(i,j)∈A r˜ij = f(0)− f(r˜) and f(r˜) = f(r). Because
f(r) ≤ x − m, we have U(m, r) = 2w − c1(m) − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− 2l(f(r)). Because
f(r˜) = f(r) and f(r) ≤ x−m, we have U(m, r˜) = 2w−c1(m)−c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A r˜ij
)
−2l(f(r˜)).
Because
∑
(i,j)∈A r˜ij <
∑
(i,j)∈A rij and f(r˜) = f(r), we have U(m, r) < U(m, r˜). Thus,
(m, r) is not efficient. Henceforth, if f(r) ≤ x−m, we only consider (m, r) ∈ M × R with∑
(i,j)∈A rij = f(0)− f(r). 
Define m¯ and q¯ for efficient profiles.
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Let m¯ be a level of mitigation such that 2l′(x− m¯) = c′1(m¯). That is, the marginal
joint loss at x− m¯ equals to the marginal mitigation cost at m¯. Let U¯1(m) = 2w− c1(m)−
2l(x −m). The function U¯1(m) is maximized at m = m¯. The existence of a unique value
for m¯ is guaranteed by the assumption (A1). Note that 0 < m¯ < x.
Let q¯ be a level of reduction such that 2l′(f(0)− q¯) = c′2 (q¯). That is, the marginal
joint loss at f(0)− q¯ equals to the marginal reduction cost at q¯. Let U¯2(q) = 2w − c2 (q)−
2l(f(0)− q), where 0 ≤ q ≤ f(0). The function U¯2(q) is maximized at q = q¯. The existence
of a unique value for q¯ is guaranteed by the assumption (A2). Note that 0 < q¯ < f(0).
Let R¯ := {r¯ ∈ R : ∑(i,j)∈A r¯ij = q¯ and q¯ = f(0) − f(r¯)} be a set of reduction
strategies with capacity q¯. From equality (III.10), if r ∈ R is a bottleneck reduction strategy
with capacity
∑
(i,j)∈A rij = q¯, then r ∈ R¯.
My analysis is divided into three cases depending on the bottleneck capacity of
network (N,A, y), which equals to the maximum transmission of bads through the network.
The bottleneck capacity of network (N,A, y) is small if f(0) < x − m¯, intermediate if
x− m¯ ≤ f(0) and f(r¯) < x, and large if x ≤ f(r¯).
If the bottleneck capacity is small, that is, if f(0) < x − m¯, the maximum trans-
mission of bads (MTB) through network (N,A, y) is less than the extent of bads at the
source (EBS) mitigated to the efficient level. Thus, even if player 1 acts to mitigate the
EBS to the efficient level x− m¯, the extent of network bads does not decrease. Therefore,
in every efficient profile, player 1 does not act at all. Whether player 2 acts depends on the
loss and cost functions. The following proposition summarizes this result. All proofs are
presented in Appendix A.
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Proposition 4
If the bottleneck capacity is small, that is, if f(0) < x − m¯, every efficient profile is (0, 0)
or (0, r¯). Furthermore, if 2l(f(0)) < c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)), then (0, 0) is the only efficient
profile. However, if 2l(f(0)) > c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)), then (0, r¯) is the only efficient profile.
If the bottleneck capacity is intermediate, that is, if x − m¯ ≤ f(0) and f(r¯) < x,
the MTB through network (N,A, y) is greater than or equal to the EBS mitigated to the
efficient level, and the EBS is greater than the MTB through network (N,A, y − r¯). Thus,
both players can decrease the extent of network bads to the efficient level. Therefore, in
every efficient profile, either player 1 or player 2 acts to decrease the extent of network bads.
There is no efficient profile in which neither player acts. Whether player 1 acts or player 2
acts depends on the loss and cost functions.
Proposition 5
If the bottleneck capacity is intermediate, that is, if x − m¯ ≤ f(0) and f(r¯) < x, every
efficient profile is (0, r¯) or (m¯, 0). Furthermore, if c2 (
∑
r¯ij)+2l(f(r¯)) < c1(m¯)+2l(x−m¯),
then (0, r¯) is the only efficient profile. However, if c2 (
∑
r¯ij)+2l(f(r¯)) > c1(m¯)+2l(x−m¯),
then (m¯, 0) is the only efficient profile.
The followings are examples of efficient profiles.
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Example 8
Consider network (N,A, y) in Example 6. The MTB through network (N,A, y) is f(0) = 30.
Suppose that x = 36. Assume that l(e(m, r)) = (e(m, r))2, c1(m) = m2, and c2 (
∑
rij) =
(
∑
rij)
2. Because 4(x− m¯) = 2m¯ and x = 36, we have m¯ = 24. Because 4(f(0)− q¯) = 2q¯
and f(0) = 30, we have q¯ = 20. Suppose that player 2 chooses r¯ = (0, 10, 5, 5, 0). The
MTB through network (N,A, y − r¯) is f(r¯) = 10. Because x − m¯ = 12 ≤ 30 = f(0)
and f(r¯) = 10 < 36 = x, the bottleneck capacity is intermediate. Because c2 (
∑
r¯ij) +
2l(f(r¯)) = 600 < 864 = c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), from Proposition 5, (0, r¯) is efficient. 
In the example above, (0, r¯) is efficient and player 2 reduces the MTB to the
efficient level f(r¯). However, in the example below, (m¯, 0) is efficient and player 1 mitigates
the EBS to the efficient level x− m¯.
Example 9
Consider Example 8 but now assume that c2 (
∑
rij) = 4 (
∑
rij)
2. Because 4(f(0)− q¯) = 8q¯
and f(0) = 30, we have q¯ = 10. Suppose that player 2 chooses r¯ = (0, 4, 3, 3, 0). The MTB
through (N,A, y−r¯) is f(r¯) = 20. Because x−m¯ = 12 ≤ 30 = f(0) and f(r¯) = 20 < 36 = x,
the bottleneck capacity is intermediate. Because c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)) = 1200 > 864 =
c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), from Proposition 5, (m¯, 0) is efficient. 
If the bottleneck capacity is large, that is, if x ≤ f(r¯), the EBS is less than or
equal to the MTB through network (N,A, y − r¯). Thus, even if player 2 acts to reduce the
MTB to the efficient level f(r¯), the extent of network bads does not decrease. Therefore,
in every efficient profile, player 2 does not act at all. Whether player 1 acts depends on the
loss and cost functions.
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Proposition 6
If the bottleneck capacity is large, that is, if x ≤ f(r¯), every efficient profile is (0, 0) or
(m¯, 0). Furthermore, if 2l(x) < c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), then (0, 0) is the only efficient profile.
However, if 2l(x) > c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), then (m¯, 0) is the only efficient profile.
To sum up, in every efficient profile, either (a) player 1 acts to mitigate the extent
of bads at the source or (b) player 2 acts to reduce the maximum transmission of bads
through the network or (c) neither player acts. In case (a), player 2 free-rides on player 1’s
mitigation effort. The efficient level of mitigation is m¯, where the marginal joint loss equals
to the marginal mitigation cost. In case (b), player 1 free-rides on player 2’s reduction effort.
The efficient level of reduction is
∑
(i,j)∈A r¯ij = q¯, where the marginal joint loss equals to
the marginal reduction cost.
As in Proposition 4, if (0, 0) is the only efficient profile, the extent of network bads
is e(0, 0) = f(0). As in Propositions 4 and 5, if (0, r¯) is the only efficient profile, the extent
is e(0, r¯) = f(r¯). As in Propositions 5 and 6, if (m¯, 0) is the only efficient profile, the extent
is e(m¯, 0) = x − m¯. As in Proposition 6, if (0, 0) is the only efficient profile, the extent is
e(0, 0) = x. Later I will compare these with the extent of network bads in equilibrium.
Equilibria
Define mˆ for player 1’s best response. Let mˆ be a level of mitigation such that
l′(x − mˆ) = c′1(mˆ). That is, the marginal private loss at x − mˆ equals to the marginal
mitigation cost at mˆ. Let uˆ1(m) = w− c1(m)− l(x−m). The function uˆ1(m) is maximized
at m = mˆ. The existence of a unique value for mˆ is guaranteed by the assumption (A1).
Note that 0 < mˆ < x and mˆ < m¯.
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Lemma 3
The set of player 1’s best responses to r ∈ R is
BR1(r) =

{0} if f(r) < x− mˆ;
{0} if x− mˆ ≤ f(r) < x and l(f(r)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ);
{0, mˆ} if x− mˆ ≤ f(r) < x and l(f(r)) = c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ);
{mˆ} if x− mˆ ≤ f(r) < x and l(f(r)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ);
{mˆ} if x ≤ f(r).
Given r ∈ R, the maximum transmission of bads through network (N,A, y − r) is
f(r), and player 1’s best response depends on f(r). Player 1’s best response to r ∈ R is
m = 0 or m = mˆ or both.
There is a necessary condition for player 2’s best responses, which is analogous
to Remark 2. If r ∈ R is a best response to m ∈ M such that f(r) ≤ x − m, then∑
(i,j)∈A rij = f(0) − f(r). Thus, there is no wasted reduction capacity to decrease the
extent of network bads.
Remark 3
For each (m, r) ∈ M × R with f(r) ≤ x −m, if ∑(i,j)∈A rij > f(0) − f(r), then r is not a
best response to m. To see this, let r ∈ R be such that ∑(i,j)∈A rij > f(0) − f(r). Also,
let r˜ ∈ R be such that ∑(i,j)∈A r˜ij = f(0)− f(r˜) and f(r˜) = f(r). Because f(r) ≤ x−m,
we have u2(m, r) = w− c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− l(f(r)). Because f(r˜) = f(r) and f(r) ≤ x−m,
we have u2(m, r˜) = w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A r˜ij
)
− l(f(r˜)). Because ∑(i,j)∈A r˜ij <∑(i,j)∈A rij and
f(r˜) = f(r), we have u2(m, r) < u2(m, r˜). Thus, r is not a best response to m. Henceforth,
if f(r) ≤ x−m, we only consider r ∈ R with ∑(i,j)∈A rij = f(0)− f(r). 
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Define qˆ for player 2’s best responses. Let qˆ be a level of reduction such that
l′(f(0) − qˆ) = c′2(qˆ). That is, the marginal private loss at f(0) − qˆ equals to the marginal
reduction cost at qˆ. Let uˆ2(q) = w − c2(q)− l(f(0)− q), where 0 ≤ q ≤ f(0). The function
uˆ2(q) is maximized at q = qˆ. The existence of a unique value for qˆ is guaranteed by the
assumption (A2). Note that 0 < qˆ < f(0) and qˆ < q¯.
Let Rˆ := {rˆ ∈ R : ∑(i,j)∈A rˆij = qˆ and qˆ = f(0) − f(rˆ)} be a set of reduction
strategies with capacity qˆ. From equality (III.10), if r ∈ R is a bottleneck reduction strategy
with capacity
∑
(i,j)∈A rij = qˆ, then r ∈ Rˆ.
Lemma 4
The set of player 2’s best responses to m ∈M is
BR2(m) =

{0} if x−m ≤ f(rˆ);
{0} if f(rˆ) < x−m and l(x−m) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ));
{0} ∪ Rˆ if f(rˆ) < x−m and l(x−m) = c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ));
Rˆ if f(rˆ) < x−m and l(x−m) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)).
Given m ∈M , the mitigated extent of bads is x−m, and player 2’s best response
depends on x−m. Player 2’s best response to m ∈M is r = 0 or r = rˆ or both.
From Lemma 3, player 1’s best response is m = 0 or m = mˆ. From Lemma 4,
player 2’s best response is r = 0 or r = rˆ. Consider strategy profiles (0, 0), (0, rˆ), (mˆ, 0), and
(mˆ, rˆ). At a glance we can see that (mˆ, rˆ) is not an equilibrium. If (mˆ, rˆ) is an equilibrium,
mˆ is a best response to rˆ. From Lemma 3, if mˆ is a best response to rˆ, it is necessary that
x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ). From Lemma 4, if x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), then rˆ is not a best response to mˆ. This is
a contradiction.
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Now there remain three strategy profiles (0, 0), (0, rˆ), and (mˆ, 0) for equilibria. In
these strategy profiles there is at most one player who acts to decrease the extent of network
bads. In strategy profile (0, 0), neither player acts. In strategy profile (0, rˆ), player 2 acts
to reduce the maximum transmission of bads through network (N,A, y) by
∑
(i,j)∈A rˆij = qˆ.
In strategy profile (mˆ, 0), player 1 acts to mitigate the extent of bads at the source by mˆ.
We want to know when these strategy profiles are equilibria. From Lemma 3,
player 1’s best response to r ∈ R depends on f(r). From Lemma 4, player 2’s best response
is r = 0 or r = rˆ. There are six cases for equilibria. Table 1 shows these cases. In Table 1
there are three contradictions. Because f(rˆ) < f(0), if f(0) < x−mˆ, we have f(rˆ) < x−mˆ,
which contradicts x − mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) and x ≤ f(rˆ). Similarly, if f(0) < x, we have f(rˆ) < x,
which contradicts x ≤ f(rˆ).
Table 1. Six Cases for Equilibria
r = 0 r = rˆ Results
f(rˆ) < x− mˆ Proposition 7
f(0) < x− mˆ x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x Contradiction
x ≤ f(rˆ) Contradiction
f(rˆ) < x− mˆ Proposition 8
x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x Proposition 9
x ≤ f(rˆ) Contradiction
f(rˆ) < x− mˆ Proposition 10
x ≤ f(0) x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x Proposition 11
x ≤ f(rˆ) Proposition 12
Proposition 7 Suppose that f(0) < x− mˆ.
(i) If l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (0, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(ii) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (0, rˆ) is the only equilibrium.
Because f(0) < x− mˆ, from Lemma 3, we know that mˆ is not a best response to
0. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is not an equilibrium. In Proposition 7, every equilibrium is (0, 0) or (0, rˆ).
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Proposition 8 Suppose that x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and f(rˆ) < x− mˆ.
(i) If l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ) and l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (0, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
(ii) If l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ) and l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (0, rˆ) is the only
equilibrium.
(iii) If l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ) and l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (mˆ, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
(iv) If l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ) and l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) > l(x − mˆ), then (0, rˆ)
and (mˆ, 0) are the only pure strategy equilibria.
(v) If l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ) and l(x − mˆ) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (0, rˆ) is the
only equilibrium.
If x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ), from Lemma 3, we know that
mˆ is not a best response to 0. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is not an equilibrium. Therefore, in (i) and (ii)
of Proposition 8, every equilibrium is (0, 0) or (0, rˆ).
However, if x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), from Lemma 3, we
know that 0 is not a best response to 0. Thus, (0, 0) is not an equilibrium. Therefore, in
(iii) through (v) of Proposition 8, every equilibrium is (0, rˆ) or (mˆ, 0).
The followings are examples of equilibria.
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Example 10
Recall Example 8. Since 2(x−mˆ) = 2mˆ and x = 36, we have mˆ = 18. Since 2(f(0)− qˆ) = 2qˆ
and f(0) = 30, we have qˆ = 15. If player 2 chooses rˆ = (0, 5, 5, 5, 0), the MTB through
(N,A, y − rˆ) is f(rˆ) = 15. From (iv) of Proposition 8, both (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0) are equilibria.

In the example above, there are two equilibria (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0). In Example 8,
however, (0, r¯) is efficient. Player 2 does not act in the equilibrium (mˆ, 0) but he must act
in the efficient profile (0, r¯). If player 2 does not act by choosing 0, knowing that player 1’s
best response to 0 is mˆ, player 2 can free-ride on player 1’s action in the equilibrium (mˆ, 0).
Proposition 9 Suppose that x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) and f(0) < x.
(i) If l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), then (0, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
(ii) If l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), then (mˆ, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
(iii) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), then (0, rˆ) is the only
equilibrium.
(iv) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij)+ l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ) > l(f(rˆ)), then (0, rˆ) and
(mˆ, 0) are the only pure strategy equilibria.
(v) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(rˆ)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), then (mˆ, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
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If f(0) < x and l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij)+ l(f(rˆ)), from Lemma 4, rˆ is not a best response
to 0. Thus, (0, rˆ) is not an equilibrium. In (i) and (ii) of Proposition 9, every equilibrium
is (0, 0) or (mˆ, 0).
If f(0) < x and l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), from Lemma 4, 0 is not a best re-
sponse to 0. Thus, (0, 0) is not an equilibrium. In (iii) through (v) of Proposition 9, every
equilibrium is (0, rˆ) or (mˆ, 0).
The followings are examples of equilibria.
Example 11
Recall Example 9. Recall Example 9. Since 2(x − mˆ) = 2mˆ and x = 36, we have mˆ = 18.
Since 2(f(0)− qˆ) = 8qˆ and f(0) = 30, we have qˆ = 6. If player 2 chooses rˆ = (0, 2, 2, 2, 0),
the MTB through (N,A, y − rˆ) is f(rˆ) = 24. From (iv) of Proposition 9, both (0, rˆ) and
(mˆ, 0) are equilibria. 
In the example above, there are two equilibria (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0). In Example 9,
however, (m¯, 0) is efficient. Player 1 does not act in the equilibrium (0, rˆ) but he must act
in the efficient profile (m¯, 0). If player 1 does not act by choosing 0, knowing that player 2’s
best response to 0 is rˆ, player 1 can free-ride on player 2’s action in the equilibrium (0, rˆ).
Proposition 10 Suppose that x ≤ f(0) and f(rˆ) < x− mˆ.
(i) If l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(ii) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) > l(x − mˆ), then (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0) are the only pure
strategy equilibria.
(iii) If l(x− mˆ) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (0, rˆ) is the only equilibrium.
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Proposition 11 Suppose that x ≤ f(0) and x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x.
(i) If l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(ii) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(rˆ)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), then (mˆ, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
(iii) If l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and l(f(rˆ)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), then (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0)
are the only pure strategy equilibria.
If x ≤ f(0), from Lemma 3, we know that 0 is not a best response to 0. Thus,
(0, 0) is not an equilibrium. Therefore, in Propositions 10 and 11, every equilibrium is (0, rˆ)
or (mˆ, 0).
Proposition 12 If x ≤ f(rˆ), then (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
If x ≤ f(rˆ), from Lemmas 3 and 4, we know that mˆ is the only best response to
0 and rˆ, and 0 is the only best response to mˆ. Thus, in Proposition 12, (mˆ, 0) is the only
equilibrium.
To sum up, in every equilibrium, either (a) player 1 acts to mitigate the extent
of bads at the source or (b) player 2 acts to reduce the maximum transmission of bads
through the network or (c) neither player acts. In case (a), player 2 free-rides on player
1’s mitigation effort. The equilibrium level of mitigation is mˆ, where the marginal private
loss equals to the marginal mitigation cost. In case (b), player 1 free-rides on player 2’s
reduction effort. The equilibrium level of reduction is
∑
(i,j)∈A rˆij = qˆ, where the marginal
private loss equals to the marginal reduction cost.
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Now I compare equilibria with efficient profiles. Table 2 summarizes the results.
If either (a) player 1 acts or (b) player 2 acts, in an efficient profile, the marginal
cost of action equals to the marginal joint loss. In an equilibrium, the marginal cost of action
equals to the marginal private loss. Thus, in case (a), the equilibrium level of mitigation
is less than the efficient level, that is, mˆ < m¯. Also, in case (b), the equilibrium level of
reduction is less than the efficient level, that is,
∑
rˆij <
∑
r¯ij .
From Proposition 4, if the bottleneck capacity of network (N,A, y) is small, that is,
if f(0) < x−m¯, every efficient profile is (0, 0) or (0, r¯). From Proposition 7, if f(0) < x−mˆ,
every equilibrium is (0, 0) or (0, rˆ). Because f(0) < x − m¯ implies f(0) < x − mˆ, if the
bottleneck capacity of network (N,A, y) is small, every equilibrium is (0, 0) or (0, rˆ). Thus,
in every efficient profile and in every equilibrium, either (b) player 2 acts or (c) neither
player acts. There may be an efficient equilibrium (0, 0) in which neither player acts.
From Proposition 5, if the bottleneck capacity of network (N,A, y) is intermediate,
that is, if x−m¯ ≤ f(0) and f(r¯) < x, every efficient profile is (0, r¯) or (m¯, 0). Thus, in every
efficient profile, either (a) player 1 acts or (b) player 2 acts. However, no efficient profile is
an equilibrium and no equilibrium is efficient. There may be an equilibrium (0, 0) in which
neither player acts. Further, as shown in Examples 10 and 11, there may be an equilibrium
where the player in action is not the player who must act in the efficient profile.
From Proposition 6, if the bottleneck capacity of network (N,A, y) is large, that
is, if x ≤ f(r¯), every efficient profile is (0, 0) or (m¯, 0). Thus, in every efficient profile, either
(a) player 1 acts or (c) neither player acts. From Proposition 12, if x ≤ f(rˆ), then (mˆ, 0)
is the only equilibrium. Because x ≤ f(r¯) implies x ≤ f(rˆ), if the bottleneck capacity of
network (N,A, y) is large, (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, player 1
always acts. However, the equilibrium level of action is less than the efficient level.
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Table 2. Efficient Profiles (EF) versus Equilibria (EQ)
Bottleneck capacity Profiles (a) Player 1 acts (b) Player 2 acts (c) Neither acts
Small EF No EF (0, r¯) (0, 0)
EQ No EQ (0, rˆ) (0, 0)
Intermediate EF (m¯, 0) (0, r¯) No EF
EQ (mˆ, 0) (0, rˆ) (0, 0)
Large EF (m¯, 0) No EF (0, 0)
EQ (mˆ, 0) No EQ No EQ
Unless (0, 0) is an efficient equilibrium, no efficient profile is an equilibrium and no
equilibrium is efficient. The exception is observed only if the bottleneck capacity is small.
Therefore, except for this case, we can conclude that players 1 and 2 do not have incentives
to choose efficient profiles.
In equilibrium (0, 0), the extent of network bads is e(0, 0) = f(0). Thus, the
maximum transmission of bads through network (N,A, y) is allowed.
In equilibrium (0, rˆ), the extent of network bads is e(0, rˆ) = f(rˆ). In efficient
profile (0, r¯), the extent is e(0, r¯) = f(r¯). Because f(r¯) < f(rˆ), the extent of network bads
is greater in equilibrium (0, rˆ).
In equilibrium (mˆ, 0), the extent of network bads is e(mˆ, 0) = x − mˆ. In efficient
profile (m¯, 0), the extent is e(m¯, 0) = x − m¯. Because mˆ < m¯, the extent of network bads
is greater in equilibrium (mˆ, 0).
Cooperative Solutions
In my strategic model players may not have incentives to choose efficient profiles.
Now transfers are allowed between players. We want to know if it is possible to make
transfers that provide incentives to choose efficient profiles. I introduce a coalitional game
and study cooperative solutions for the game.
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A coalition S ⊆ {1, 2} is a non-empty set of players. A coalitional game v is a
function that associates with each coalition S a number v(S), which is called the value of
coalition S. In my model a coalitional game v is defined as follows:
v({1}) = max
m∈M
u1(m, 0);
v({2}) = max
r∈R
u2(0, r);
v({1, 2}) = max
(m,r)∈M×R
U(m, r).
That is, each player maximizes his payoff without any reduction or mitigation from the
other if he belongs to a singleton coalition. Players 1 and 2 maximize the joint payoff if
they belong to the same coalition.
Player 1 maximizes u1(m, 0) by choosing a best response to 0. From Lemma 3,
player 1’s best response is 0 or mˆ. If 0 is a best response to 0, then v({1}) = u1(0, 0). If mˆ
is a best response to 0, then v({1}) = u1(mˆ, 0).
Player 2 maximizes u2(0, r) by choosing a best response to 0. From Lemma 4,
player 2’s best response is 0 or rˆ. If 0 is a best response to 0, then v({2}) = u2(0, 0). If rˆ
is a best response to 0, then v({2}) = u2(0, rˆ).
Players 1 and 2 maximize the joint payoff U(m, r) by choosing an efficient profile.
The coalitional game v is superadditive if v({1})+v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}). An allocation
(a1, a2) is a vector of payoffs with transfers, where ai is the allocation of player i = 1, 2.
An allocation (a1, a2) is in the set of imputations of the coalitional game v if a1 ≥ v({1}),
a2 ≥ v({2}), and a1 + a2 = v({1, 2}). If the coalitional game v is superadditive, the set of
imputations of v is non-empty.
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Proposition 13
The coalitional game v is superadditive.
If (m, r) is an efficient profile and (a1, a2) is an allocation in the set of imputations
of v, players 1 and 2 jointly choose (m, r) and make transfers in a way that player i = 1, 2
gets a net transfer of ai − ui(m, r). Each player is better off by using this cooperative
solution than by maximizing his payoff alone. Therefore, it is possible to make transfers
that provide incentives for efficiency.
Remark 4
If the bottleneck capacity is intermediate, in every cooperative solution, the efficient player
acts to decrease the extent of network bads and gets a positive net transfer from the other.
If player 1 is the efficient player, he gets at least v({1})− u1(m¯, 0) from player 2. However,
if player 2 is the efficient player, he gets at least v({2})− u2(0, r¯) from player 1. 
For every coalitional game with two players, superadditivity is equivalent to con-
vexity. Thus, the coalitional game v is convex. Because every convex game is totally
balanced and every totally balanced game is a flow game, the coalitional game v is a flow
game. Kalai and Zemel (24) show how to construct a flow game.
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Conclusion
This chapter introduces a strategic network model where bads are transmitted
from a source to a sink as a flow through a network. Two players wish to decrease network
bads. One player can act to mitigate the extent of bads at the source. The other player can
act to reduce the maximum transmission of bads through the network. Each player incurs
the cost of action but benefits from the decrease in network bads.
I characterize efficient profiles and equilibria in this model. The equilibrium level of
action is less than the efficient level. Interestingly, the player who acts in an equilibrium may
not be the player who must act in the efficient profile. Further, there may an equilibrium
where neither player acts. However, this equilibrium may not be efficient. Therefore,
strategic inaction may lead to inefficiency.
Unless there is an efficient equilibrium where neither player acts, no efficient profile
is an equilibrium and no equilibrium is efficient. Thus, the players may not have incentives
to choose efficient profiles. I also study cooperative solutions where the players jointly choose
an efficient profile and make transfers to each other. The players can achieve efficiency by
using cooperative solutions.
An extension of this model is to consider multiple network players. Networks
may be controlled by various players. Coordination between players is a key to reduce the
transmission of bads through networks. Another extension is to study the transmission
of network goods. Online data streaming can be an example. Content providers, such as
Netflix and YouTube, and network service providers, such as AT&T and Verizon, have dif-
ferent interests that may lead to inefficient use of networks. In these extensions cooperative
solutions can help achieve social efficiency.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 4. Suppose that f(0) < x− m¯. From Remark 1, we only consider
(m, r) ∈ M × R with m = 0 or r = 0. First, let (0, r) be any profile with m = 0.
Because f(0) < x− m¯, we have f(r) < x. Thus, the extent is e(0, r) = f(r), and the joint
payoff is U(0, r) = 2w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− 2l(f(r)). From Remark 2, we only consider
(0, r) ∈ M × R with ∑(i,j)∈A rij = f(0) − f(r). Now the joint payoff is U(0, r) = 2w −
c2 (f(0)− f(r)) − 2l(f(r)). Because f(0) < x − m¯, we have f(r¯) < x. Also, f(r) < x.
Thus, the joint payoff is maximized when f(r) = f(r¯). The maximum joint payoff is
U(0, r¯) = 2w − c2 (
∑
r¯ij)− 2l(f(r¯)).
Second, let (m, 0) be any profile with r = 0. If x − m ≤ f(0), the extent is
e(m, 0) = x − m, and the joint payoff is U(m, 0) = 2w − c1(m) − 2l(x − m). Because
x − m ≤ f(0) and f(0) < x − m¯, the joint payoff is maximized at m = x − f(0). The
maximum joint payoff is U(x − f(0), 0) = 2w − c1(x − f(0)) − 2l(f(0)). If f(0) ≤ x −m,
the extent is e(m, 0) = f(0), and the joint payoff is U(m, 0) = 2w − c1(m) − 2l(f(0)),
which is maximized at m = 0. The maximum joint payoff is U(0, 0) = 2w − 2l(f(0)).
Because f(0) < x− m¯, we have x− f(0) > 0. Because c1(·) is strictly increasing, we have
U(x− f(0), 0) < U(0, 0).
Thus, if the bottleneck capacity is small, that is, if f(0) < x − m¯, every efficient
profile is (0, 0) or (0, r¯). Further, if 2l(f(0)) < c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)), then U(0, 0) > U(0, r¯),
and (0, 0) is the only efficient profile. However, if 2l(f(0)) > c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)), then
U(0, 0) < U(0, r¯), and (0, r¯) is the only efficient profile. 
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Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that x − m¯ ≤ f(0) and f(r¯) < x. From Remark 1,
we only consider (m, r) ∈ M × R with m = 0 or r = 0. First, let (0, r) be any profile
with m = 0. If x ≤ f(r), the extent is e(0, r) = x, and the joint payoff is U(0, r) =
2w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− 2l(x), which is maximized at r = 0. The maximum joint payoff
is U(0, 0) = 2w − 2l(x). If f(r) ≤ x, the extent is e(0, r) = f(r), and the joint payoff is
U(0, r) = 2w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− 2l(f(r)). From Remark 2, we only consider (0, r) with∑
(i,j)∈A rij = f(0)−f(r). Now the joint payoff is U(0, r) = 2w−c2 (f(0)− f(r))−2l(f(r)).
Because f(r) ≤ x and f(r¯) < x, the joint payoff is maximized when f(r) = f(r¯). The
maximum joint payoff is U(0, r¯) = 2w − c2 (
∑
r¯ij)− 2l(f(r¯)).
Second, let (m, 0) be any profile with r = 0. If x − m ≤ f(0), the extent is
e(m, 0) = x − m, and the joint payoff is U(m, 0) = 2w − c1(m) − 2l(x − m). Because
x −m ≤ f(0) and x − m¯ ≤ f(0), the joint payoff is maximized at m = m¯. The maximum
joint payoff is U(m¯, 0) = 2w−c1(m¯)−2l(x−m¯). If f(0) ≤ x−m, the extent is e(m, 0) = f(0),
and the joint payoff is U(m, 0) = 2w− c1(m)− 2l(f(0)), which is maximized at m = 0. The
maximum joint payoff is U(0, 0) = 2w − 2l(f(0)).
Now compare the joint payoffs for profiles (0, 0), (0, r¯), and (m¯, 0). If x ≤ f(0), we
have U(0, 0) = 2w− 2l(x) and U(m¯, 0) = 2w− c1(m¯)− 2l(x− m¯). Thus, U(0, 0) < U(m¯, 0).
If f(0) ≤ x, we have U(0, 0) = 2w−2l(f(0)) and U(0, r¯) = 2w−c2 (
∑
r¯ij)−2l(f(r¯)). Thus,
U(0, 0) < U(0, r¯). In both cases, (0, 0) is not efficient.
Therefore, if the bottleneck capacity is intermediate, that is, if x − m¯ ≤ f(0)
and f(r¯) < x, every efficient profile is (0, r¯) or (m¯, 0). Further, if c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)) <
c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), then U(0, r¯) > U(m¯, 0), and (0, r¯) is the only efficient profile. However,
if c2 (
∑
r¯ij) + 2l(f(r¯)) > c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), then U(0, r¯) < U(m¯, 0), and (m¯, 0) is the only
efficient profile. 
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Proof of Proposition 6. Suppose that x ≤ f(r¯). From Remark 1, we only consider
(m, r) ∈M×R with m = 0 or r = 0. First, let (0, r) be any profile with m = 0. If x ≤ f(r),
the extent is e(0, r) = x, and the joint payoff is U(0, r) = 2w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− 2l(x),
which is maximized at r = 0. The maximum joint payoff is U(0, 0) = 2w−2l(x). If f(r) ≤ x,
the extent is e(0, r) = f(r), and the joint payoff is U(0, r) = 2w−c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
−2l(f(r)).
From Remark 2, we only consider (0, r) ∈M ×R with ∑(i,j)∈A rij = f(0)− f(r). Now the
joint payoff is U(0, r) = 2w − c2 (f(0)− f(r)) − 2l(f(r)). Because f(r) ≤ x and x ≤ f(r¯),
the joint payoff is maximized when f(r) = x. The maximum joint payoff is U(0, r) =
2w− c2 (f(0)− x)−2l(x). Because x ≤ f(r¯), we have f(0)−x > 0. Because c2(·) is strictly
increasing, we have U(0, r) < U(0, 0).
Second, let (m, 0) be any profile with r = 0. Because x ≤ f(r¯), we have x−m <
f(0). Thus, the extent is e(m, 0) = x−m, and the joint payoff is U(m, 0) = 2w − c1(m)−
2l(x−m). Because x ≤ f(r¯), we have x− m¯ < f(0). Also, x−m < f(0). Thus, the joint
payoff is maximized at m = m¯. The maximum joint payoff is U(m¯, 0) = 2w−c1(m¯)−2l(x−
m¯).
Thus, if the bottleneck capacity is large, that is, if x ≤ f(r¯), every efficient profile
is (0, 0) or (m¯, 0). Further, if 2l(x) < c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), then U(0, 0) > U(m¯, 0), and (0, 0)
is the only efficient profile. However, if 2l(x) > c1(m¯) + 2l(x− m¯), then U(0, 0) < U(m¯, 0),
and (m¯, 0) is the only efficient profile. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let r ∈ R be any reduction strategy. We divide into three cases.
Case 1. Suppose that f(r) < x−mˆ. For eachm ∈M , if x−m ≤ f(r), the extent of
network bads is e(m, r) = x−m, and the payoff of player 1 is u1(m, r) = w−c1(m)−l(x−m).
Because x−m ≤ f(r) and f(r) < x− mˆ, the payoff is maximized at m = x− f(r), and the
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maximum payoff is u1(x− f(r), r) = w − c1(x− f(r))− l(f(r)).
For each m ∈ M , if f(r) ≤ x −m, the extent is e(m, r) = f(r), and the payoff is
u1(m, r) = w− c1(m)− l(f(r)). Because c1(·) is strictly increasing, the payoff is maximized
at m = 0, and the maximum payoff is u1(0, r) = w − l(f(r)).
Because x− f(r) > mˆ and mˆ > 0, we have x− f(r) > 0. Because c1(·) is strictly
increasing, we have u1(0, r) > u1(x− f(r), r). Thus, m = 0 is the only best response.
Case 2. Suppose that x − mˆ ≤ f(r) < x. For each m ∈ M , if x − m ≤ f(r),
the extent of network bads is e(m, r) = x − m, and the payoff of player 1 is u1(m, r) =
w − c1(m) − l(x −m). Because x −m ≤ f(r) and x − mˆ ≤ f(r), the payoff is maximized
at m = mˆ, and the maximum payoff is u1(mˆ, r) = w − c1(mˆ)− l(x− mˆ).
For each m ∈ M , if f(r) ≤ x −m, the extent is e(m, r) = f(r), and the payoff is
u1(m, r) = w− c1(m)− l(f(r)). Because c1(·) is strictly increasing, the payoff is maximized
at m = 0, and the maximum payoff is u1(0, r) = w − l(f(r)).
If l(f(r)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), then u1(0, r) > u1(mˆ, r). Thus, m = 0 is the only
best response. If l(f(r)) = c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), then u1(0, r) = u1(mˆ, r). Thus, both m = 0
and m = mˆ are the best responses. If l(f(r)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), then u1(mˆ, r) > u1(0, r).
Thus, m = mˆ is the only best response.
Case 3. Suppose that x ≤ f(r). Because x ≤ f(r), for each m ∈ M , we have
x−m ≤ f(r). Thus, the extent of network bads is e(m, r) = x−m, and the payoff of player
1 is u1(m, r) = w− c1(m)− l(x−m). The payoff is maximized at m = mˆ. Thus, m = mˆ is
the only best response. 
Proof of Lemma 4. Let m ∈M be any mitigation strategy. We divide into two cases.
Case 1. Suppose that x − m ≤ f(rˆ). For each r ∈ R, if x − m ≤ f(r), the
extent of network bads is e(m, r) = x − m, and the payoff of player 2 is u2(m, r) = w −
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c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− l(x−m). Because c2(·) is strictly increasing, the payoff is maximized at
r = 0, and the maximum payoff is u2(m, 0) = w − l(x−m).
For each r ∈ R, if f(r) ≤ x −m, the extent is e(m, r) = f(r), and the payoff is
u2(m, r) = w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− l(f(r)). From Remark 3, we only consider r ∈ R with∑
(i,j)∈A rij = f(0) − f(r). Now the payoff is u2(m, r) = w − c2(f(0) − f(r)) − l(f(r)).
Because f(r) ≤ x−m and x−m ≤ f(rˆ), the payoff is maximized when f(r) = x−m. The
maximum payoff is u2(m, r) = w − c2(f(0)− x+m)− l(x−m).
Because x −m ≤ f(rˆ) and f(rˆ) < f(0), we have x −m < f(0). That is, f(0) −
x+m > 0. Because c2(·) is strictly increasing, we have u2(m, 0) > u2(m, r). Thus, 0 is the
only best response.
Case 2. Suppose that f(rˆ) < x − m. For each r ∈ R, if x − m ≤ f(r), the
extent of network bads is e(m, r) = x − m, and the payoff of player 2 is u2(m, r) = w −
c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− l(x−m). Because c2(·) is strictly increasing, the payoff is maximized at
r = 0, and the maximum payoff is u2(m, 0) = w − l(x−m).
For each r ∈ R, if f(r) ≤ x −m, the extent is e(m, r) = f(r), and the payoff is
u2(m, r) = w − c2
(∑
(i,j)∈A rij
)
− l(f(r)). From Remark 3, we only consider r ∈ R with∑
(i,j)∈A rij = f(0) − f(r). Now the payoff is u2(m, r) = w − c2(f(0) − f(r)) − l(f(r)).
Because f(r) ≤ x−m and f(rˆ) < x−m, the payoff is maximized when f(r) = f(rˆ). The
maximum payoff is u2(m, rˆ) = w − c2 (
∑
rˆij)− l(f(rˆ)).
If l(x −m) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then u2(m, 0) > u2(m, rˆ). Thus, 0 is the only
best response. If l(x −m) = c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then u2(m, 0) = u2(m, rˆ). Thus, 0 and rˆ
are the best responses. If l(x−m) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), then u2(m, rˆ) > u2(m, 0). Thus,
rˆ is the only best response. 
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Proof of Proposition 7. Because f(0) < x − mˆ, we have BR1(0) = {0}. Because
f(rˆ) < f(0) and f(0) < x − mˆ, we have f(rˆ) < x − mˆ and BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because
f(rˆ) < x−mˆ, we have f(rˆ) < x. As in (i), if l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij)+ l(f(rˆ)), then BR2(0) = {0},
and (0, 0) is the only equilibrium. As in (ii), if l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij)+ l(f(rˆ)), then BR2(0) = Rˆ,
and (0, rˆ) is the only equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 8. (i) Because x−mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x−mˆ), we
have BR1(0) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x− mˆ, we have BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x− mˆ,
we have f(rˆ) < x. Because l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = {0}. Thus, (0, 0)
is the only equilibrium.
(ii) Because x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ), we have BR1(0) =
{0}. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have
f(rˆ) < x. Also, because l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Thus, (0, rˆ) is
the only equilibrium.
(iii) Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have f(rˆ) < x. Also, because l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) +
l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = {0}. Because l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have l(x − mˆ) <
c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)). Also, because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Because
x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is
the only equilibrium.
(iv) Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we
have f(rˆ) < x. Also, because l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Because
x − mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Because
f(rˆ) < x− mˆ and l(x− mˆ) < c2 (
∑
rˆij)+ l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Thus, (0, rˆ) and
(mˆ, 0) are the only pure strategy equilibria.
(v) Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have f(rˆ) < x. Because l(x − mˆ) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) +
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l(f(rˆ)), we have l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)) and BR2(0) = Rˆ. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ and
l(x−mˆ) > c2 (
∑
rˆij)+l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(mˆ) = Rˆ. Because f(rˆ) < x−mˆ, BR1(rˆ) = {0}.
The only equilibrium is (0, rˆ). 
Proof of Proposition 9. Because x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) and f(0) < x, we have x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x
and x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x.
(i) Because x − mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), BR1(0) = {0}.
Because l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), we have l(f(rˆ)) < c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ). Also, because
x − mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x, BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x and l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we
have BR2(0) = {0}. Thus, (0, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(ii) Because f(rˆ) < x and l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = {0}.
Because x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Because x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) >
c1(mˆ) + l(x− mˆ), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(iii) Because x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ), we have BR1(0) =
{0}. Because l(f(0)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x−mˆ), we have l(f(rˆ)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x−mˆ). Also, because
x−mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x, we have BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x and l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij)+ l(f(rˆ)),
we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Thus, (0, rˆ) is the only equilibrium.
(iv) Because x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x and l(f(rˆ)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ), we have BR1(rˆ) =
{0}. Because f(rˆ) < x and l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Because
x − mˆ ≤ f(0) < x and l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ) + l(x − mˆ), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Because
x − mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Thus, (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0) are the only pure strategy
equilibria.
(v) Because l(f(rˆ)) > c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ), we have l(f(0)) > c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ). Also,
because x − mˆ ≤ f(0) < x, we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Because x − mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x and
l(f(rˆ)) > c1(mˆ)+ l(x−mˆ), we have BR1(rˆ) = {mˆ}. Because x−mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), BR2(mˆ) = {0}.
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The only equilibrium is (mˆ, 0). 
Proof of Proposition 10. (i) Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have f(rˆ) < x. Also, because
l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = {0}. Because l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we
have l(x− mˆ) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)). Also, because f(rˆ) < x− mˆ, we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}.
Because x ≤ f(0), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(ii) Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we have BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, we
have f(rˆ) < x. Also, because l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Because
x ≤ f(0), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Because f(rˆ) < x−mˆ and l(x−mˆ) < c2 (
∑
rˆij)+l(f(rˆ)),
we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Thus, (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0) are the only pure strategy equilibria.
(iii) Because l(x − mˆ) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)).
Also, because f(rˆ) < x, we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ and l(x − mˆ) >
c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(mˆ) = Rˆ. Because f(rˆ) < x − mˆ, BR1(rˆ) = {0}. Thus,
(0, rˆ) is the only equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 11. (i) Because f(rˆ) < x and l(x) < c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have
BR2(0) = {0}. Because x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), we have BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Because x ≤ f(0), we have
BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(ii) Because x ≤ f(0), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Because x − mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x and
l(f(rˆ)) > c1(mˆ)+ l(x−mˆ), we have BR1(rˆ) = {mˆ}. Because x−mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), BR2(mˆ) = {0}.
Thus, (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium.
(iii) Because x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ) < x and l(f(rˆ)) < c1(mˆ)+ l(x− mˆ), we have BR1(rˆ) =
{0}. Because f(rˆ) < x and l(x) > c2 (
∑
rˆij) + l(f(rˆ)), we have BR2(0) = Rˆ. Because
x ≤ f(0), we have BR1(0) = {mˆ}. Because x − mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), BR2(mˆ) = {0}. The only pure
strategy equilibria are (0, rˆ) and (mˆ, 0). 
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Proof of Proposition 12. Because x ≤ f(rˆ), we have x < f(0) and BR1(0) = {mˆ}.
Because x ≤ f(rˆ), we have BR1(rˆ) = {mˆ}. Because x ≤ f(rˆ), we have x − mˆ < f(rˆ) and
BR2(mˆ) = {0}. Thus, (mˆ, 0) is the only equilibrium. 
Proof of Proposition 13. We show that v({1})+ v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}). First, suppose that
x− mˆ ≤ f(0) < x.
From Lemma 3, player 1’s best response is 0 or mˆ. If 0 is a best response to 0, then
v({1}) = u1(0, 0). Because f(0) < x, we have u1(0, 0) = w− l(f(0)). If mˆ is a best response
to 0, then v({1}) = u1(mˆ, 0). Because x−mˆ ≤ f(0), we have u1(mˆ, 0) = w−c1(mˆ)−l(x−mˆ).
Thus, v({1}) = w − l(f(0)) or v({1}) = w − c1(mˆ)− l(x− mˆ).
From Lemma 4, player 2’s best response is 0 or rˆ. If 0 is a best response to 0,
then v({2}) = u2(0, 0). Because f(0) < x, we have u2(0, 0) = w − l(f(0)). If rˆ is a best
response to 0, then v({2}) = u2(0, rˆ). Because f(rˆ) < f(0) and f(0) < x, we have u2(0, rˆ) =
w − c2(
∑
rˆij) − l(f(rˆ)). Thus, v({2}) = w − l(f(0)) or v({2}) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij) − l(f(rˆ)).
We divide into four cases.
Case 1. If v({1}) = w − l(f(0)) and v({2}) = w − l(f(0)), we have
v({1}) + v({2}) = 2w − 2l(f(0)) = U(0, 0) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Case 2. If v({1}) = w − l(f(0)) and v({2}) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij) − l(f(rˆ)), because
f(rˆ) < f(0) implies v({1}) < w − l(f(rˆ)), we have
v({1}) + v({2}) < 2w − c2(
∑
rˆij)− 2l(f(rˆ)) = U(0, rˆ) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Case 3. If v({1}) = w − c1(mˆ) − l(x − mˆ) and v({2}) = w − l(f(0)), because
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x− mˆ ≤ f(0) implies v({2}) ≤ w − l(x− mˆ), we have
v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ 2w − c1(mˆ)− 2l(x− mˆ) = U(mˆ, 0) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Case 4. If v({1}) = w − c1(mˆ) − l(x − mˆ) and v({2}) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij) − l(f(rˆ)),
we consider two subcases. If x− mˆ ≤ f(rˆ), then v({2}) ≤ w − l(x− mˆ). Thus,
v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ 2w − c1(mˆ)− 2l(x− mˆ) = U(mˆ, 0) ≤ v({1, 2}).
However, if f(rˆ) ≤ x− mˆ, then v({1}) ≤ w − l(f(rˆ)). Thus,
v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ 2w − c2(
∑
rˆij)− 2l(f(rˆ)) = U(0, rˆ) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Second, suppose that f(0) < x − mˆ. From Lemma 3, 0 is the only best response
to 0, and v({1}) = u1(0, 0). Because f(0) < x − mˆ and x − mˆ < x, u1(0, 0) = w − l(f(0))
and v({1}) = w − l(f(0)).
From Lemma 4, player 2’s best response is 0 or rˆ. If 0 is a best response to
0, then v({2}) = u2(0, 0). Because f(0) < x, we have u2(0, 0) = w − l(f(0)). Thus,
v({2}) = w − l(f(0)). As in Case 1, we have v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}).
However, if rˆ is a best response to 0, then v({2}) = u2(0, rˆ). Also, if rˆ is a
best response to 0, we have f(rˆ) < x and u2(0, rˆ) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij) − l(f(rˆ)). Thus,
v({2}) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij)− l(f(rˆ)). As in Case 2, we have v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Third, suppose that x ≤ f(0). From Lemma 3, mˆ is the only best response to 0,
and v({1}) = u1(mˆ, 0). Because x− mˆ < x and x ≤ f(0), u1(mˆ, 0) = w− c1(mˆ)− l(x− mˆ)
and v({1}) = w − c1(mˆ)− l(x− mˆ).
From Lemma 4, player 2’s best response is 0 or rˆ. If 0 is a best response to 0, then
v({2}) = u2(0, 0). Because x ≤ f(0), we have u2(0, 0) = w− l(x). Thus, v({2}) = w− l(x).
Because x − mˆ < x, we have v({2}) < w − l(x − mˆ). Thus, as in Case 3, we have
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v({1}) + v({2}) < 2w − c1(mˆ)− 2l(x− mˆ) ≤ v({1, 2}).
However, if rˆ is a best response to 0, then v({2}) = u2(0, rˆ). Also, if rˆ is a
best response to 0, we have f(rˆ) < x and u2(0, rˆ) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij) − l(f(rˆ)). Thus,
v({2}) = w − c2(
∑
rˆij)− l(f(rˆ)). As in Case 4, we have v({1}) + v({2}) ≤ v({1, 2}).
Therefore, v is superadditive. 
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CHAPTER IV
THE POWER LAW OF CONFLICT
Introduction
Power law distributions have been observed in various contexts. Distributions of
wealth, city populations, academic citations, and stock market returns are a few exam-
ples. Clauset et al. (10) and Gabaix (15) present empirical examples exhibiting power law
distributions.
In particular, the power law of conflict is an empirical regularity that the frequency
of a conflict event scales as an inverse power of the severity of the conflict event. Precisely,
the frequency f(x) of a conflict event with severity x ≥ xmin scales as f(x) ∝ x−α, where
xmin is the minimum level above which the power law holds and α is the scaling parameter
of the power law. The power law of conflict is first observed by Richardson (36) in a broad
context that includes murders and wars.
There are no theoretical explanations for the power law of conflict. It is a complex
task to understand what causes conflict, and in turn, the power law of conflict. There may
be cultural, economic, historical, and political circumstances. However, the power law of
conflict has been universally observed across time and region. Cederman (8) observes the
power law in interstate wars between 1820 and 1997. Bohorquez et al. (5) and Clauset et
al. (11) also observe the power law in terrorist events and insurgent wars in recent decades.
Thus, there may be common circumstances that lead to the power law of conflict across
time and region.
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The power law of conflict may be caused by strategic behavior of players in an
adversarial relationship. With cultural, economic, historical, and political circumstances,
an adversarial relationship may evolve between players. Strategic behavior of these players
leads to the power law of conflict. See Figure 6. To test the hypothesis that strategic
bahavior causes the power law, we need to develop a simple model amenable to experimental
analysis. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation for experimental
and empirical testing.
We build a strategic model with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium. There are
two adversarial players, Attacker and Defender. Given a quantity of bads, Attacker chooses
how many bads to carry through a route to a target. Simultaneously and independently,
Defender chooses whether to block the route to stop the transport of bads to the target.
When Attacker successfully carries bads to the target, that is, when Attacker carries bads to
the target and Defender does not block the route, the target is damaged. Defender suffers
from target loss, which is determined by the amount of bads and the marginal target loss.
Attacker gains from target loss, which is scaled up by the target loss power. Attacker incurs
the cost of carrying bads while Defender incurs the cost of blocking the route.
Figure 6. Common Circumstances
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In equilibrium both players choose mixed strategies. Attacker carries no bads
or the maximum amount of bads while Defender blocks the route or not. Target loss is
caused when Attacker carries the maximum amount of bads and Defender does not block
the route. The probability of target loss can be calculated as a function of target loss.
If the marginal target loss is a random variable distributed uniformly on an interval, the
probability distribution of target loss follows a power law. The scaling parameter of the
power law is determined by the target loss power.
The driving force of the power law in our model is strategic behavior of players
in an adversarial relationship. Both players create unpredictability in equilibrium because
they are adversarial against each other. For example, if Defender’s action is perfectly
predictable, Attacker will take advantage of Defender. Thus, both players make their actions
unpredictable by playing mixed strategies. Furthermore, changes in mixed strategies, due
to changes in the marginal target loss, generate a power law distribution. That is, in our
model, equilibrium play and its comparative statics yield the power law of conflict.
The parameters of the power law are estimated from data by using the procedure
of Clauset et al. (10). Our data are based on Global Terrorism Database (28). The power
law is a good fit to the data.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a strategic
model. Section 3 analyzes equilibrium behavior in this model. Section 4 studies a power
law. Section 5 discusses future research.
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Model
There is a route that connects Source to Target. Two players, Attacker and De-
fender, choose their strategies simultaneously and independently. See Figure 7 for an illus-
tration.
Attacker is endowed with a quantity q ≥ 1 of bads at Source. Attacker chooses a
strategy a with 0 ≤ a ≤ q. The set of strategies for Attacker is denoted by A. By choosing
a ∈ A, Attacker carries an amount a of bads from Source to Target.
Defender wishes to stop the transport of bads to Target. Defender chooses a
strategy b ∈ {0, 1}. The set of strategies for Defender is denoted by B. If b = 1, Defender
blocks the route, and if b = 0, Defender does not block the route.
Players are allowed to choose mixed strategies. The set of mixed strategies for
Attacker is denoted by ∆(A) and the set of mixed strategies for Defender is denoted by
∆(B).
If Defender does not block the route, that is, if b = 0, Attacker successfully carries
an amount a of bads to Target. The bads carried to Target cause a target loss. Defender
loses la from the target loss, where l > 1 denotes a marginal target loss. Attacker earns
(la)k, where k > 1 denotes a target loss power.
If Defender blocks the route, that is, if b = 1, Attacker fails to carry bads to Target.
No target loss is caused. However, Defender incurs a cost c ≥ 1 of blocking the route.
If Attacker carries an amount a of bads to Target, he incurs an expense ea, where
e > 0 denotes a marginal expense. Assume that l > e.
Attacker earns a constant worth w1 and Defender earns w2.
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For each (a, b) ∈ A×B, Attacker’s payoff is
u1(a, b) =

w1 + (la)k − ea if b = 0;
w1 − ea if b = 1,
and Defender’s payoff is
u2(a, b) =

w2 − la if b = 0;
w2 − c if b = 1.
For each σ = (σ1, σ2) ∈ ∆(A) ×∆(B), Attacker earns an expected payoff of u1(σ1, σ2) =
Eσ[u1(a, b)] and Defender earns an expected payoff of u2(σ1, σ2) = Eσ[u2(a, b)].
Figure 7. Route from Source to Target
Equilibrium Analysis
To analyze mixed strategy equilibrium, we assume that c < lq. In words, the
blocking cost is less than the maximum target loss. However, if c > lq, strategy profile
(q, 0) is the only equilibrium. Thus, in equilibrium, Attacker carries the maximum amount
of bads and Defender does not block the route.
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Proposition 14
Any amount a with 0 < a < q is a dominated strategy for Attacker.
Proof. Let a be any strategy with 0 < a < q. Let σ1 be a mixed strategy such that
σ1(0) + σ1(q) = 1. We show that a is dominated by σ1. If Defender chooses b = 0, then
u1(σ1, 0) = w1+ σ1(q)((lq)k − eq) and u1(a, 0) = w1+ (la)k − ea. Thus, if σ1(q) > (la)
k−ea
(lq)k−eq ,
we have u1(σ1, 0) > u1(a, 0). If Defender chooses b = 1, then u1(σ1, 1) = w1−σ1(q)(eq) and
u1(a, 1) = w1 − ea. Thus, if σ1(q) < aq , we have u1(σ1, 1) > u1(a, 1). Because (la)
k−ea
(lq)k−eq <
a
q
and aq < 1, there is σ1(q) with
(la)k−ea
(lq)k−eq < σ1(q) <
a
q . Thus, a is dominated by σ1. 
After removing dominated strategies, our model can be represented in a matrix
game. See Table 3.
Table 3. Matrix Game
1 \ 2 0 1
0 w1, w2 w1, w2 − c
q w1 + (lq)k − eq, w2 − lq w1 − eq, w2 − c
For Attacker, a = 0 is the best response to b = 1 and a = q is the best response to b = 0.
The set of rationalizable strategies for Attacker is {0, q}. For Defender, b = 0 is the best
response to a = 0 and b = 1 is the best response to a = q. The set of rationalizable
strategies for Defender is {0, 1}. Furthermore, there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Now we study mixed strategy equilibrium. Let σ∗1 be a mixed strategy such that
σ∗1(0) = 1 − c/(lq) and σ∗1(q) = c/(lq). Let σ∗2 be a mixed strategy such that σ∗2(0) =
(eq)/(lq)k and σ∗2(1) = 1− (eq)/(lq)k.
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Proposition 15
Strategy profile (σ∗1, σ∗2) is the only equilibrium.
Proof. It suffices to show that each player makes the other player indifferent between the
pure strategies played with positive probability. By choosing σ∗1, Attacker makes Defender
indifferent between b = 0 and b = 1. Given σ∗1, Defender’s payoffs are
u2(σ∗1, 0) = σ
∗
1(0)u2(0, 0) + σ
∗
1(q)u2(q, 0)
= (1− c/(lq))(w2) + (c/(lq))(w2 − lq)
= w2 − c
and
u2(σ∗1, 1) = σ
∗
1(0)u2(0, 1) + σ
∗
1(q)u2(q, 1)
= w2 − c.
Thus, u2(σ∗1, 0) = u2(σ∗1, 1). By choosing σ∗2, Defender makes Attacker indifferent between
a = 0 and a = q. Given σ∗2, Attacker’s payoffs are
u1(0, σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(0)u1(0, 0) + σ
∗
2(1)u1(0, 1)
= w1
and
u1(q, σ∗2) = σ
∗
2(0)u1(q, 0) + σ
∗
2(1)u1(q, 1)
= ((eq)/(lq)k)(w1 + (lq)k − eq) + (1− (eq)/(lq)k)(w1 − eq)
= w1
Thus, u1(0, σ∗2) = u1(q, σ∗2). Therefore, (σ∗1, σ∗2) is the only equilibrium. 
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In equilibrium, Attacker carries no bads with probability 1−c/(lq) and carries the
maximum amount of bads with probability c/(lq). Defender does not block the route with
probability (eq)/(lq)k and blocks the route with probability 1− (eq)/(lq)k.
In equilibrium, Attacker earns a payoff of w1 and Defender earns a payoff of w2−c.
Thus, equilibrium (σ∗1, σ∗2) is Pareto dominated by strategy profile (0, 0), where Attacker
earns w1 and Defender earns w2. However, strategy profile (0, 0) is not an equilibrium,
because Attacker is better off by choosing a = q.
In equilibrium, target loss is caused when Attacker carries the maximum amount
of bads and Defender does not block the route. Let L = lq and let C = ceq. Target loss
X = L occurs with probability CL−k−1 and no target loss X = 0 occurs with probability
1 − CL−k−1. Thus, given L, equilibrium target loss X|L follows a binomial distribution.
Precisely,
P (X = 0|L) = 1− CL−k−1 and P (X = L|L) = CL−k−1. (IV.1)
Power Law
The power law of conflict states that the frequency of a conflict event scales as an
inverse power of the severity of the event. Precisely, if the severity X of a conflict event is
measured by a number x ≥ xmin, that is, if X = x, the probability of the event conditional
on X > 0 scales as
p(X = x|X > 0) ∝ x−α,
where xmin is the minimum level above which the power law holds and α is the scaling
parameter of the power law.
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We want to show that the probability distribution of target loss X conditional on
X > 0 follows a power law.1
Suppose that all parameters are given and fixed except the marginal target loss
l, which is a random variable distributed uniformly between lmin and lmax. Suppose that
c/q < lmin and lmin < lmax.
When l is realized, it is observed by both players. In equilibrium, target loss X =
L = lq occurs with probability CL−k−1 and no target loss X = 0 occurs with probability
1− CL−k−1.
Because l is uniformly distributed between lmin and lmax, L is uniformly distributed
between Lmin = qlmin and Lmax = qlmax. Precisely, the probability distribution of L is
fL(L) = 1Lmax−Lmin .
We present the Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) of target loss X condi-
tional on X > 0.
Proposition 16
For each x with Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax, the CDF of target loss X conditional on X > 0 is
P (X ≤ x|X > 0) = L
−k
min − x−k
L−kmin − L−kmax
, (IV.2)
where Lmin, Lmax, and k are the parameters of the distribution function.
1In empirical data, such as Global Terrorism Database (28), the severity of a conflict event is measured by
the number of fatalities in the event. Conflict events with no fatalities are often ignored by media and may
not be included in empirical data that are based on media reports. Thus, we study a power law distribution
conditional on X > 0, that is, on a positive number of fatalities.
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Proof. Note that for each x > 0,
P (X ≤ x|X > 0) = P (0 < X ≤ x)
P (X > 0)
=
P (X ≤ x)− P (X = 0)
1− P (X = 0) .
Calculate P (X ≤ x) and P (X = 0). Note that
P (X ≤ x|L) =

1 if x ≥ L;
1− CL−k−1 if x < L.
Or equivalently,
P (X ≤ x|L) = 1− (CL−k−1) · 1(x < L),
where 1(·) is an indicator function.
Because
∫ Lmax
Lmin
fL(L)dL = 1, for each x with Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax,
P (X ≤ x) =
∫ Lmax
Lmin
P (X ≤ x|L)fL(L)dL
=
∫ Lmax
Lmin
(1− (CL−k−1) · 1(x < L))fL(L)dL
=1−
∫ x
Lmin
(CL−k−1) · 1(x < L)fL(L)dL−
∫ Lmax
x
(CL−k−1) · 1(x < L)fL(L)dL.
Because 1(x < L) = 0 for Lmin ≤ L ≤ x and 1(x < L) = 1 for x ≤ L ≤ Lmax, for x with
Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax,
P (X ≤ x) =1−
∫ Lmax
x
(CL−k−1)fL(L)dL
=1−
∫ Lmax
x
(CL−k−1)
(
1
Lmax − Lmin
)
dL
=1−
(
C
Lmax − Lmin
)(
x−k − L−kmax
k
)
.
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Also,
P (X = 0) =
∫ Lmax
Lmin
P (X = 0|L)fL(L)dL
=
∫ Lmax
Lmin
(
1− CL−k−1
)( 1
Lmax − Lmin
)
dL
=1−
(
C
Lmax − Lmin
)(
L−kmin − L−kmax
k
)
.
Thus,
P (X ≤ x)− P (X = 0) =
(
C
Lmax − Lmin
)(
L−kmin − x−k
k
)
and
1− P (X = 0) =
(
C
Lmax − Lmin
)(
L−kmin − L−kmax
k
)
.
Therefore, for each x with Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax, the CDF of target loss X conditional
on X > 0 is
P (X ≤ x|X > 0) = L
−k
min − x−k
L−kmin − L−kmax
,
where Lmin, Lmax, and k are parameters. 
By differentiating the CDF (IV.2), we can show that the Probability Distribution
Function (PDF) of target loss X conditional on X > 0 follows a power law. Precisely, for
each x with Lmin ≤ x ≤ Lmax,
p(X = x|X > 0) = dP (X ≤ x|X > 0)
dx
=
(
k
L−kmin − L−kmax
)
x−k−1, (IV.3)
where Lmin is the minimum level above which the power law holds and k + 1 is the scaling
parameter of the power law. Interestingly, the scaling parameter is determined by the target
loss power k.
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The Complementary Cumulative Distribution Function (CCDF) of X conditional
on X > 0 is
P (X > x|X > 0) = 1− P (X ≤ x|X > 0) = x
−k − L−kmax
L−kmin − L−kmax
. (IV.4)
We want to estimate parameters Lmin, Lmax, and k from data. We use Global
Terrorism Database (28) and focus on terrorist events occurred in a single country. Suppose
that target loss is measured by the number of fatalities in a terrorist event.
In Iraq there were 2233 terrorist events from 1976 to 2007. The number of fatalities
ranged from 1 to 202. Figure 8 shows the empirical CCDF of the Iraqi data.
Figure 8. Empirical Distribution
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We assume that Lˆmax equals to the maximum number of fatalities in the data
and estimate Lmin and k by using the two-step procedure of Clauset et al. (10). In the
first step we take Lmin as given and estimate k by the method of maximum likelihood.
Note that estimate k depends on the value of Lmin. To make this clear, we denote the
estimate by k(Lmin). In the second step we choose the value of Lˆmin that makes the
probability distributions of the data and the model as close as possible above the minimum
level Lˆmin. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov or KS statistic is used to define the distance between
two probability distributions. Finally, the estimate for k is kˆ = k(Lˆmin). This two-step
procedure will be presented more precisely in Appendix A.
Figure 9. Power Law Distribution
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From the Iraqi data we estimate parameters as Lˆmin = 8, Lˆmax = 202, and kˆ =
1.27. Figure 9 shows the empirical CCDF above the minimum level Lˆmin = 8 in black
circles as well as the model CCDF (IV.4) with estimated parameters in a gray curve. The
KS statistic is 0.01 between these two distributions. Our model is a good fit to the data.2
Future Research
This chapter examines how strategic behavior leads to the power law of conflict.
Equilibrium play and its comparative statics yield a power law. The scaling parameter of
the power law is determined by the target loss power. The parameters of the power law can
be estimated from data. We cannot, however, empirically test whether equilibrium play
and its comparative statics yield a power law because we cannot observe whether players
use equilibrium mixed strategies. In empirical data on conflict events, we only observe the
realized (and reported) actions of players.3 The model developed in this chapter, however,
can be used to test the power law of conflict in the laboratory. In experiments we can
test if subjects use equilibrium mixed strategies and if subjects adjust strategies as the
experimenter adjusts payoffs.4
We can also test if laboratory data exhibit a power law distribution. The power
law of conflict has been studied only in empirical data. It will be interesting to study the
2During the period of the data there may be “regime shifts” that affect the nature of conflict in Iraq.
If we restrict the data to the period between 2003 and 2007, there were 2149 events with the maximum
number of fatalities being 202. Parameters are estimated as Lˆmin = 10, Lˆmax = 202, and kˆ = 1.40 with the
KS statistic 0.005. Thus, it may give a better fit to restrict the data to a specific time period.
3In other contexts, especially in sports, it is possible to track down players’ actions to infer their strategies.
Walker and Wooders (39) obtain field data from matches between professional tennis players and test if the
players follow equilibrium mixed strategies. Palacios-Huerta (31) studies penalty kicks in professional soccer
games.
4Mixed strategy play has been studied in experiments. For example, see Brown and Rosenthal (7), Levitt
et al. (27), Ochs (29), O’Neill (30), Palacios-Huerta and Volij (32), and Wooders (42).
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power law in laboratory data. If we observe the power law in experiments, we may be able
to support our theory that strategic behavior in conflict events causes the power law.
Another interesting line of research would be to make the payoff functions of
Chapter II strictly convex so that the equilibrium would be unique and then investigate the
comparative statics properties in the general case.
Appendix A
We estimate parameters Lmin and k by using the two-step procedure of Clauset et
al. (10).
In the first step we take Lmin as given. From data {xi}ni=1 with xi ≥ Lmin for
i = 1, . . . , n, we estimate k by the method of maximum likelihood. From (IV.3), the PDF
of target loss X conditional on X > 0 is
p(X = x|X > 0) =
(
k
L−kmin − L−kmax
)
x−k−1.
Thus, the probability that the data {xi}ni=1 is drawn from the PDF is
p({xi}|k) =
n∏
i=1
(
k
L−kmin − L−kmax
)
x−k−1i ,
which is also called the likelihood of the data. Given Lmin, the Maximum Likelihood
Estimator (MLE) for k is
k(Lmin) = argmax
k
p({xi}|k). (IV.5)
However, it is impossible to solve for k(Lmin) analytically. We can use a numerical method
to find k(Lmin).
In the second step we choose the value of Lˆmin that makes the probability dis-
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tributions of the data and the model as close as possible above Lˆmin. Given Lmin and
k = k(Lmin), let F (x) denote the CDF (IV.2) of our model. Given Lmin, let G(x) denote
the empirical CDF of the data {xi}ni=1. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov or KS statistic is defined
as the maximum difference in absolute value between F (x) and G(x). That is,
D = max
x
|F (x)−G(x)|. (IV.6)
Because both F (x) and G(x) depend on Lmin, the KS statistic D also depends on Lmin.
To make this clear, we denote D by D(Lmin). Our estimate Lˆmin is the value of Lmin that
minimizes D(Lmin). That is,
Lˆmin = argmin
Lmin
D(Lmin).
Finally, the estimate for k is kˆ = k(Lˆmin).
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